

E 440
.R48

Copy 2

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



00001734313







RUIN OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

Reports of the Covode and other Committees.

The Missouri compact was a parole of honor given by the slave States to obtain an extension of the limits of the slave institution beyond those originally assigned to it by the ordinance of 1787—the basis adopted before and under the Constitution. The boundaries first and last established were meant to confine that fatal disease to all free institutions in a sort of quarantine, to prevent its spread, so that the sanitary principles, the growth of the Revolution, embodied in the Constitution of the confederated Republic, might gradually work out its eradication.

The violation of that compromise was a repudiation of the good faith which had marked all previous mutual arrangements among the States of the Confederacy. It renounced the honest patriotism which was the cement of the Government, with the design of supplanting it by those mercenary, self-aggrandizing principles, out of which combinations grow, establishing the rule of the few over the many.

This great change in the *morale* of the Democratic party was effected by Mr. Calhoun, who contrived to make slavery its most influential element, while he reversed its direction. Mr. Jefferson's impulse gave a tendency towards a gradual deliverance of the country from slavery, as threatening the overthrow of all its free institutions—as pregnant with insurrections, civil war, and ruin of republican government. Mr. Calhoun controverts Jefferson's principles—denounces as "*folly and delusion*" his belief, once almost universal in the South, that "*slavery was a moral and political evil*"—and asserts, "*it is the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world.*"

This new doctrine Mr. Calhoun has inculcated successfully on those owning both the soil and slaves in the South. The high prices of the staples whetting avarice, and the monopoly of wealth, thus created, rousing the political ambition in a sectional oligarchy arrogant in controlling all the slave States by combination, has resolved all the politics of that region into Mr. Calhoun's one absorbing idea—the enslavement of the laboring masses, as essential to

their power and the safety of the governing class. The control of the National Government for many years has opened up new prospects to them in conquests abroad, as consequent on the triumph of their prophet's principles, and, like the followers of Mahomet, they make the propagation of slavery a part of their morale or religion, as well as the basis of what they call free institutions. It is politic in them to assume that to be true democracy which transfers the sovereignty of the nation to a combination of slaveholders, and slaveholding to be moral, as performing a duty to God.

Long-indulged selfishness, looking through the distorted eyes of intense avarice and ambition, will not bear the sight of anything repugnant to its enjoyments. The political rights of citizens, as well as the natural rights of man, have no toleration from those who hold power and are educated as oppressors. The lash, the torture, the domestic prison-house, the horrible piracy of the slave trade, conjoined with filibustering upon feeble neighboring Republics, to immolate and drive one tribe of victims from their homes, to cram them with multitudes of a still more helpless race, must all conspire to maintain the slavery-extension system, crown it with conquests, and make it flourish as a growing empire, like that of the early Sultans.

Mr. Calhoun's insane ambition has inspired his maddened followers to look towards this sort of glory. He was certainly a man of audacious intellect. He found our great Western Republic under the full headway of the revolutionary forces impelling our free institutions, "on the full tide of successful experiment." The land of the free was inscribed on its flag. He had the hardihood, on getting command at the helm, to reverse the machinery, and dash backward on the danger from which we had escaped; and he hoisted the black flag, when all civilized nations had declared themselves its enemy. Our country has felt a revulsion on being thrown back in its course, but it will not suffer from the shock more than the giant ship, the Great Eastern, from a sudden reverse of its engines. It will soon resume its easy forward

movement, under the direction of that power, the popular will, which the interest and intelligence of all contribute to enforce and make authoritative.

No man was more highly gifted than Mr. Calhoun to disturb the regular action of free government. His mind was a sort of perpetual motion, driving skilfully, and always against the natural tendency of the masses. At one time, his ambition addressed itself to command the influence of the wealthy classes of the North. It was then he employed the pen of his friend, Mr. McDuffie, to give his high-toned aristocratic doctrine in his essays, signed "One of the People." Then he was for a bank and high protective tariff. Then, through the influence and on the motion of Mr. McDuffie, the Legislature passed its self-denying ordinance, declaring, that although protective duties were mischievous to the South, yet, as they promoted the general welfare in creating manufactures, its patriotism would bear the local burden. The North did not reward this disinterestedness by making Mr. Calhoun President, and then suddenly the tariff was denounced by him and his friends as a flagrant breach of the Constitution, and Mr. Preston put forth the nullification manifesto, a paper prepared by Mr. Calhoun with the most elaborate skill. Then followed the rally of the Southern delegations in Congress at the Jefferson birthday dinner, 1830, to band them together for secession, when President Jackson, who was invited to countenance it, covered the conspirators with dismay by the stern rebuke, which silenced the hilarity of the table, "THE FEDERAL UNION, IT MUST BE PRESERVED."

Next came the nullification ordinance of South Carolina, closely followed up by the proclamation and the force bill of Gen. Jackson, from which Mr. Calhoun and his chiefs escaped, deserting their military array, and surrendering to Mr. Clay. They submitted to Mr. Clay's scheme of a tariff, as a salvo for the Constitution and their pride, though more obnoxious to the principle they asserted than that they proposed to resist by arms.

This terminated the war against the Union on the pretext of the tariff; but Mr. Calhoun kept up his war upon the Jackson administration under the banners of the Bank, while insidiously preparing a more extensive combination to broach secession on the part of the South by creating alarm for the safety of its slave institution. No serious alarm could be produced; and although the irritating discussions between the nullifiers and abolitionists in Congress resulted in exciting bad feeling on the part of the slave towards the free States, no apprehension of aggression from the latter could even be dissembled sufficiently to countenance another secession attempt. Mr. Calhoun then changed his tactics, and looked to aggression on the part of the South, stimulated by the ambition of extending the power of its

institution, at the risk of collision and a breach between the States. His design was assisted by the defeat of Mr. Van Buren, the death of Gen. Harrison, and the accession of Mr. Tyler to the Presidency. Tyler was one of the earliest proselytes to nullification, and was classed by Col. Benton among "Calhoun's Mormons." On becoming Premier in Tyler's Administration, Calhoun became, *de facto*, President, and made conquests for slavery the main purpose of the Administration.

To produce combinations in favor of this policy at home, his first step was to provoke hostility to it abroad. He hunted up from the files of the State Department an old letter of Lord Aberdeen, saying something deprecating the perpetuation of slavery, and he responded by proclaiming the purpose of annexing Texas, to give a fresh impetus to the march of slavery. He addressed another letter to our Minister to France, (Mr. King, of Alabama,) avowing the same design, to extort from that Power some expression of repugnance to what he knew its policy condemned. He then pushed his treaty of Texan annexation into the Senate, where it was rejected. Next, he made annexation, by a bare resolution of Congress, the subject of violent controversy in both Houses, threatening disruption, and carried it, after it was on the eve of defeat, by inducing Mr. Polk, the President elect, to practice a fraud on Benton and his friends, who had voted down the treaty, and meant to vote down the resolution. The trick was thus compassed. Polk pledged himself, that if Benton's plan of annexing Texas on certain conditions guarding against the dangers of Calhoun's scheme were added as an alternative to the latter, in the execution of it, by the incoming President, Benton's would be adopted and carried out. The annexation was voted in this alternative form, and Polk, who on the next day was sworn in as President, violated his solemn pledges, without a pretence of denial, and gave effect to Calhoun's project. The absolute subserviency of Mr. Polk to Mr. Calhoun's policy had been secured in advance of his election.

By broaching suddenly the extension of slavery as a test question in the nominating Convention of the Democracy, 1844, (the delegates to which had been almost universally instructed to vote for Mr. Van Buren,) the Southern members were combined, to exact a pledge from him to annex Texas with that view. Mr. Van Buren declined, in a letter, to adopt the course prescribed, or to annex Texas without reaching it through diplomacy. This answer accomplished Mr. Calhoun's design against him, embodied the whole Southern delegation in opposition; and this rendering his election impossible, the body appointed to nominate him, refused. Looking to this result, Mr. Calhoun, as the head of Tyler's Administration, had convoked a Convention gotten up by his

office-holders in the different States, to meet at Baltimore on the same day with the Democratic Convention. While, therefore, Mr. Pickens and others of Mr. Calhoun's South Carolina friends attended the latter, laying their credentials on the table, to vote, if necessary, the Tyler Convention nominated him for re-election, with a view to control the nomination of the Democracy. If it nominated any man hostile to Texas and slavery extension, the Democratic Southern delegates were ready to declare against him, and go for Tyler, making a Democratic defeat inevitable. In this state of things, Polk, who had declared himself for annexation, supplanted Van Buren; and Calhoun, holding Tyler as his automaton candidate in hand, was enabled to make his own bargain with Polk, who was given to understand, that Tyler, who would receive the vote of Calhoun's party in the South, and transfer several States to the Whigs, would decline in his favor, if he would commit himself, secretly, to Mr. Calhoun's whole scheme of slavery extension. Polk yielded; and it was expressly but confidentially stipulated by him, with Mr. Pickens, that he (Polk) would disarm the organ established by General Jackson to maintain his policy, and set up one favorable to Mr. Calhoun's designs, which thenceforward became common to both. The consequences began immediately to reveal themselves. Tyler resigned, in favor of Polk. In advance of the election, he furtively withdrew fifty thousand dollars from the Treasury, and put it at the disposal of prominent personages, who were in the scheme, to provide a new organ. Mr. Buchanan, who was in the secret, wrote a letter to Mr. Bibb, (Mr. Calhoun's accomplice for years, and through his influence made Secretary of the Treasury,) recommending the agent who received the money. Mr. Polk's perfidy to Colonel Benton in violating the pledge to adopt his mode of annexing Texas, providing preliminary conditions, was the first public signal of revolt from the Democracy, and adhesion to the nullifiers. The next was his refusal to appoint Flagg to the Treasury, (to which he had pledged himself to General Jackson,) followed by the induction of Walker, to devote its resources to the extension of slavery. Then the withdrawal from Mr. Butler, of New York, the overture he had made of the War Department as soon as he declared his willingness to accept it, giving the place to Marcy, the opponent of Van Buren and Wright, to whose support he owed the Presidency. Soon after this came the repudiation of the *Globe*, the installation of Ritchie, with Hunter, Mason, and all the rest of Tyler's and Calhoun's Virginia junto, drawing after them all who had given evidence of alienation from the Democracy during the Jackson and Van Buren administrations. In the North, the same confidence in malcontents prevailed. In Massachusetts, the Greens, of the *Post*, and Cushing,

of Tyler corporal's guard, ruled the hour. In New York, the Hunkers. In Pennsylvania, Buchanan, as Premier in the Cabinet, stamped his sinister and oblique look on all the aims of the party. In Missouri, Atchison, who obtained his seat in the Senate from the favor of Benton, was made his enemy and rival by the Administration. Yet Polk was reduced to ask Benton's aid to deliver them from the "masterly inactivity" into which Calhoun's policy had brought their military operations in Mexico.

They tendered him the Lieutenant Generalship, on the adoption of his plan of carrying on the war, to the city of Mexico, and yet concluded by betraying him and defeating the bill for his appointment in the Senate. Then the Administration contrived that coalition between its own Democratic partisans, the nullifiers, under Atchison, and the Whigs, under Mr. Geyer, (elected Senator,) which sacrificed him at home. Cass and McLane, who had brooded over the disaffection in the Jackson Cabinet on the removal of the deposits, who had assisted in the bank panic, and who aided the conspiracy to bring on the revolution which overthrew the Democratic successor of Jackson, were made representative men of the new Democracy installed by Calhoun, Tyler, and Polk, after those who had rebuilt that of Jefferson, under Jackson, were ostracised. And certainly no better exemplars of the policy which was to control north of Mason and Dixon's line could have been found than Cass and McLane. They were the high priests of that mysterious influence which breeds doughfaces—a tribe fattening on the spoils of Government, and propagating that fear of change through which many well-meaning men are often subjected to the despotism of the most depraved.

The effect of the system, by which that of Jackson, handed down by the revolutionary stock, was superseded, is before us. The extension of slavery into Texas only whetted the ambition of the Southern oligarchs for the conquest of Mexico. The war was made, which Mr. Calhoun's policy would have rendered terminable only by a military subjugation reducing the mass of the population to the condition of vassalage. That was the meaning of his "masterly inactivity," which proposed simply a military occupation commanding the country. Col. Benton's plan brought the war to a close, securing to the people of the portion of Mexico, purchased at the cost of fifteen millions to extend our boundaries to the Pacific, the full enjoyment of their own local laws, under which the slave system was abrogated. This turned the war of the nullifiers on our own Government. They resolved, if California came in as a free State, the slave States would go out of the Union. General Taylor, who made the conquests, and succeeded Polk as President, (the latter being justly repudiated by all parties,) was prepared to veto the compromise of 1850, which recognised the right of converting

any portion of the free territory acquired of Mexico into slave territory. Fillmore, the Northern Vice President, coming into power on the death of Taylor, seeking a nomination from the South, surrendered the position taken by his principal, and opened the way to slavery into the free Mexican territories annexed to ours. He sunk under his submission, and President Pierce succeeded, solemnly pledging himself to maintain the limitations imposed by the various compromises against the extension of slavery. Another term in the Presidency, only to be hoped for by sacrificing his honor to the slave states, was an irresistible bribe to his poor ambition. Affected fear of a dissolution of the Union was the mask of dough under which he covered his treachery, and he entered the race with Douglas, and endeavored to outrun him in concessions to secure the Southern phalanx. The Missouri compromise was repealed, and the whole system designed by the fathers of the Republic to resist the progress of slavery, and make deliverance at some time possible, was pulled down.

The political alarmists communicated their panic to the Supreme Court, and the venerable incumbents, apprehending that secession might slip their benches from under them, concluded to make them fast by reversing all former decisions, and considering all ordinances, all laws which treated slavery as a State institution depending on local laws, as mistakes of unenlightened generations, and entered up a decree to plant it on the Constitution of the United States. Fortified in that citadel by the judgment of the tribunal of the last resort, no law of Congress, of State or Territory, can disturb it. It goes wherever the Constitution, the supreme law, goes. Mr. Buchanan on coming to the Presidency took a step beyond all his predecessors, and the Supreme Court. He attempted to drag Kansas as a State into the Union with a slave Constitution, against the consent of its people, employing military force, fraud, and corruption, to accomplish it, and having failed, has contrived to exclude the State from the right to come into the Union, accorded to all others under similar circumstances. Why are not those who wield all the powers of the Federal Government so absolutely satisfied with their triumph? Is it that a sense of wrong is ever attended with an apprehension of redress?

And what has this unsatisfactory ineffectual effort to build up a system hostile to that established by the fathers of the Government, cost the country in its moral and material interests?

Mr. Sherman, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, submitted to the House a statement showing the growth of the expenses and population at every census, and rate of tax for each inhabitant. This, compared with the increase during the present Administration, shows that at the outset, 1792, our population

being in round numbers four millions, the tax per head was *fifty cents*; in 1830, (General Jackson's term,) in a population of about thirteen millions, the tax was \$1.03; in 1840, (Mr. Van Buren's term,) the population being about seventeen millions, the tax was \$1.41. Now, (in Mr. Buchanan's time, 1858,) the inhabitants estimated at twenty-eight millions, the rate of tax is \$3 per head. By the increase of inhabitants, a little more than three-fold at the Jackson period, the tax was only doubled. At the Van Buren period, the inhabitants being increased six-fold, the tax falls short ten cents of being tripled. On the population, estimated as increased seven-fold in 1858, the increase of tax from the actual expenditure of 1857 shows an increase of tax of thirty-six-fold for each person. Now, this enormous increase in the rate of expenditure, compared with that shown to mark its progress, with that of the population from the beginning up to the close of Van Buren's Administration, argues the operation of some cause more potent than the inclination of the head of the Government towards extravagance and corruption. It argues that some prevailing passion or principle influenced a powerful party in the country to protect a responsible Executive in such an abandonment of the economy which custom had established, (under a succession of Administrations and parties in the Republic,) and which had concurred in making frugal expenditure a test of a faithful attention to the interests of the people. Nowhere was this test so severely applied as in the slave States, where taxation by the Federal Government had become peculiarly obnoxious, because levied by a tariff which, it was insisted, oppressed the South, while it protected the North.

The extraordinary increase of taxation and expenditure, out of proportion to the increase of population, becomes the more extraordinary, therefore, when it is considered that all the Administrations under which it has grown up were installed and controlled absolutely by the embodied power of the parsimonious South. This paradox, however, is easy of solution. The negro mania, which Mr. Calhoun's inap-
peasable ambition laid hold of, as operating on the whole nervous system of the slave States, was excited every way to combine them as a whole, and bring all their energies to advance his schemes. The gigantic strides of the North to power in wealth and population was pointed at, to alarm; its repugnance to slavery, to provoke; its progress in arts, literature, commerce, and manufactures, to create envy; and all to excite sectional ambition. To gratify it and his own, Mr. Calhoun proposed to band all their strength to add new empire for slavery. War, to extend the area of slavery, became the watchword in the South; and the application of the wealth of the North to such a cause, no matter how profusely, was true economy for the South. The military service of

Van Buren's term was raised by the Florida war, from \$21,000,000, its test in the preceding term, to \$47,000,000. This was to capture slaves, and drive out the Seminoles, to make a new slave State. As this State was within the then existing boundary of slavery, this expenditure could not be held to be one enlarging the area of slavery; yet it is fair to ascribe to the necessities of that institution the encumbering of Mr. Van Buren's Administration with an additional \$7,000,000 annually during his term. It was, however, on the accession of Mr. Calhoun to power under Tyler, that the system was organized—devoting the treasures of the nation to Southern policy, and making a slave empire to encroach on free territory, and swallow the Gulf and the tropics. The annexation of Texas was the first step; the war with Mexico to extend the boundary of Texas, the next. The naval and military service for the four years of Polk's term amounted to \$123,048,599. Fifteen (15) millions were then paid to Mexico for the region acquired by the sword. Ten (10) millions more were paid to Texas, for the pretended claim she asserted over New Mexico, which, though assented to by Northern men, doubtless to disentangle it from Texas and slavery, now boasts a slave code, through the influence of the civil and military power of the Federal Administration over that province. Then followed the Gadsden treaty, providing \$20,000,000 for Arizona—cut down in the Senate to \$10,000,000, lest the enormity of the amount should burst the Senate's prison-house, and let out the corruptions divulged in secret session which procured the arrangement, and lead to new corruptions. The desert, or arid zone, which was looked to in the first treaty as a barrier to separate the nations, was acquired to draw the contemplated Pacific railroad within the boundaries of Mexico, and facilitate the ultimate appropriation of the whole country. It would require a volume to present in detail the waste of the slavery propagandist policy, begun under Tyler, and pursued under Polk, Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan.

In the progress of it, a Congress of our foreign ministers issued the Ostend Manifesto, threatening war with Spain unless she would take some hundreds of millions for Cuba. This shows the spirit of the movement; and the actual growth of the national expenditures under its influence, from Mr. Van Buren's time forward, exhibited in figures, proves how steadily and rapidly it has worked. The expenditure of our Administrations, from Washington to Van Buren inclusive, making about half a century, according to Secretary Cobb's report of February, 1858, amounts to \$621,262,856.53. The aggregate expenditure under Tyler, Polk, Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan, (up to 1857,) is \$692,385,792.38. To this add, predicated on Mr. Cobb's own estimates, the one hundred and thirty mil-

lions for the two last years of Mr. Buchanan's term, and we have, for twenty years of the slave propagandist administration of the Treasury, an outlay of \$822,385,792.38, to contrast with \$621,262,856.53, for the half century of expenditure under all previous Presidents.

But it is not the foreign war waged to spread our peculiar institution which costs most, costly as military movements always are. The policy which requires corruption to enlist the great body of a reluctant nation to secure its adoption, is still more expensive. In fact, it costs more to recruit a party for slavery in the North than an army. The last two years of Mr. Buchanan's Administration cost more than the four years of Mr. Madison, when involved in the conflict with Great Britain, and when war was blazing on the land, the lakes, and ocean.

Mr. Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, in "*the Statement of Expenditures from 1789 to June 30th, 1857*," called for by Congress, exhibits the expenditure of the last four years of Mr. Madison's Administration, including the war with Great Britain, to be \$108,537,086.88. And in the same statement, the past two years of the present Administration show an expenditure of \$125,366,396.21. So one year of peace under Mr. Buchanan cost more than two years of war under Madison—a war waged with the greatest military and naval Power of the earth, and closed in the triumph of our arms. But a scrutiny of the motives and the results of the vast expenditure involved in Mr. Buchanan's policy will make the contrast between himself and the illustrious President he so bitterly denounced, while maintaining the conflict with Great Britain, the more striking.

The very first measures of our ultra Southern President and Cabinet on reaching power, and without awaiting the meeting of the Congress chosen by the people to form a part of the Government during his term, was to march an army on Kansas, under pretence of quelling a rebellion in Utah.

This is the modest account given by the President of war measures, begun without consulting Congress, raising our military expenditures to a higher point than during the war with Great Britain:

"The people of Utah, almost exclusively, belong to this church; and believing with a fanatical spirit that he is Governor of the Territory by divine appointment, they obey his commands as if these were direct revelations from Heaven. If, therefore, he chooses that his Government shall come into collision with the Government of the United States, the members of the Mormon church will yield implicit obedience to his will. Unfortunately, existing facts leave but little doubt that such is his determination. Without entering upon a minute history of occurrences, it is sufficient to say, that all the officers of the United States, judicial and executive, with the single exceptions of two Indian agents, have found it necessary for their personal safety to withdraw from the Territory; and there no longer remains any Government in Utah but the despotism of Brigham Young. This being the condition of affairs in the Territory, I could not

mistake the path of duty. As Chief Magistrate, I was bound to restore the supremacy of the Constitution and laws within its limits. In order to effect this purpose, I appointed a new Governor and other Federal officers for Utah, and sent with them a military force for their protection, and to aid as a *posse comitatus* in case of need in the execution of the laws."

"A *posse comitatus* to introduce Governor Cummings to Governor Brigham Young." What proof had the President that Young, who was appointed and held as Governor and Indian agent under the commission of his predecessor, would not recognise a commission from him appointing a successor? He did not afford Young the opportunity of repulsing his authority, as he did not assert that authority by sending a Governor to supersede him, nor did he take a step to inquire into the charges made against Young by Judge Drummond, on which the latter resigned—charges which Young denied, begged might be investigated, and which have since been disproved. The army was marched in hot haste to inaugurate Governor Cummings. The war is thus opened by General Scott in person:

CIRCULAR.

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, May 28, 1857.

"To the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Commissary General, Surgeon General, Paymaster General, and Chief of Ordnance:

"Orders having been dispatched in haste for the assemblage of a body of troops at Fort Leavenworth, to march thence to Utah as soon as assembled, the General-in-chief, in concert with the War Department, issues the following instructions: [Here follow the details of the forces, amounting to 2,500 men, and all the equipments.]

[Signed] "WINFIELD SCOTT."

General Harney, who had gathered the main force at Fort Leavenworth, receives the following laconic order from

"HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, June 29, 1857.

"The Fifth Infantry is ordered to proceed immediately to join you, from Jefferson Barracks, as soon as it and the body of Tenth arrive. Proceed to your destination without unnecessary delay."

On the next day, another letter from the General-in-chief tells Gen. Harney that general orders "have indicated your assignment to the command of an expedition to the Utah Territory;" and adds:

"The community, and in part the civil Government of Utah Territory, are in a state of substantial rebellion against the laws and authority of the United States—new civil Government is about to be designated, and to be charged with the establishment of law and order. Your able and energetic aid, with that of the troops under your command, is relied upon, to insure the success of his mission."

Now, with all this hurry of regiments, "DISPATCHED IN HASTE, for the assemblage of a body of troops at Fort Leavenworth, TO MARCH THENCE TO UTAH AS SOON AS ASSEMBLED, there to crush rebellion against the laws and Government of the United States," nothing was accomplished for a year.

The array brought together in thirty days from remote quarters of the country, and ready to march in June, 1857, could only present itself and the Governor (about to be designated) to Brigham Young in June, 1858. During the summer, fall, and winter of 1857, Young was in the regular discharge of his

functions, under the orders of the Department at Washington, and, as Indian agent, in correspondence with Mr. Denver, Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Indeed, the rebellion charged upon him was founded upon acts imputed as having occurred under the Administration of Mr. Buchanan's predecessors, and not thought worthy of investigation by them, nor by Mr. Buchanan himself, although invited by Governor Young. The truth is, the gathering of troops in such haste at Leavenworth, in Kansas, in June, 1857, was to frown down the Topeka Legislature, elected by a majority of the people of the State, who, imitating the example of other Territories, and taking the popular-sovereignty principle of the Kansas-Nebraska act for authority, had formed a Constitution for submission to Congress, and elected a Legislature to give it effect. The next object of the introduction of the army into Kansas was to countenance the election of a Convention elected by the pro-slavery minority, to annul this Constitution made by the majority, and set up another. It was proposed by the Administration to submit this pro-slavery Constitution to the votes of the people, and doubtless it hoped, with aid of the votes of the soldiery, and the control brought with the army in contracts and disbursements, in frauds, bribery, and overawing at the polls, that the slave Constitution could be carried; and, at the worst, if the people should rise in resistance, the army could begin with rebellion in Kansas, and put it down preliminary to that in Utah.

Governor Walker, sworn as a witness before the Covode Committee, makes apparent the motives which stayed for a year, in Kansas, the troops under Harney, although under orders of the General-in-chief to march immediately on Utah. Mr. Walker's testimony reveals the secret that the tactics of the Administration now had changed:

"This attempt to make Kansas a slave State developed itself in the fall of 1857. It first was fully developed by the terrible forgeries in the pretended returns—they were not legal returns—that were sent to me as Governor of the Territory, and which I rejected, although that rejection gave a majority of the Territorial Legislature to my political opponents, the Republicans, at which, I am free to say, I was deeply grieved. I did my best to secure a Democratic majority in that Legislature, and exerted myself most anxiously, making stump speeches, &c. The first forgery presented to me was the case at Oxford, which was a forgery upon its face; and that it was so, has since been acknowledged by one of the judges whose name purported to be signed to it. In a public document, since published by him, he declares that he never did affix his signature to it. In Oxford, more than sixteen hundred votes were attempted to be given in a village of six houses, where there were not fifty voters; and it is now ascertained that not thirty votes were really given; the rest were all forgeries. My rejection of that return, inasmuch as it affected the two large counties of Johnson and Douglas, gave a majority of the Territorial Legislature to the Republicans.

"I was then very bitterly denounced, at which I felt profoundly indifferent, because I thought that any man who would approve or endorse such forgeries was a base and dishonest man, and I preferred his censure to his approval. Various personal threats were made, which I also disregarded.

"The next return presented was that from McGee county, where there certainly were not twenty voters, but which was returned as over twelve hundred votes, given at three

different precincts, and where it is now ascertained there was no election helden at all—not a vote given in the county. Those pretended returns were also rejected by me; and at length it was fully developed that, contrary to all the pledges given, especially by Calhoun himself, the President of the Convention, that they would submit the Constitution to the vote of the people, another course was resolved upon.

"Finally, a few days before the vote was taken upon the subject, Mr. Calhoun, the President of the Convention, called upon me, and submitted substantially the programme as to slavery which was subsequently adopted by the Convention, and asked my concurrence. He presented various prospects of the highest place from the people of this Union if I would concur, and assured me that that was the programme of the Administration. I said that that was impossible, and showed Mr. Calhoun this letter of Mr. Buchanan to me, of the 12th of July, 1857. He said that the Administration had changed its policy."

The fact stated by Calhoun to Gov. Walker is shown to be true by the concurrent testimony of Secretary Cobb, Secretary Thompson, and Martin, clerk of the Interior Department. Martin was sent out to attend the birth of the Lecompton Constitution. Each of these witnesses labored hard to conceal the truth. All three lay great stress on the prominent circumstance that each was urgent, as was the President, for the submission of the Constitution at one time, which they knew to be slave; but they try to wink out of sight the important point, that they suddenly changed their plan when they found their schemes for carrying it by a vote of the people would fail. They then contrived a clause to perpetuate the slavery which already existed in Kansas; and then they provided, by another clause, that no vote should be given against the Constitution itself, containing this provision, but that the suffrages should be written on ballots, thus—"FOR THE CONSTITUTION WITH SLAVERY," or, "FOR THE CONSTITUTION WITHOUT SLAVERY," and Mr. Walker says, "those who opposed the Constitution were not permitted to vote at all." Now, as all were obliged to vote for the Constitution, with its clause declaring that the slavery existing there should be perpetuated, and that the words "without slavery" were to be construed as a vote against new importations of slaves, it simply amounted to a provision that Kansas should be a slave State, to be stocked with slaves, either by unchecked emigration, or by the slower process of propagation from the considerable number of slaves already there. The original plan of the Administration was to have the State Convention make the Constitution slave out and out, and so have it voted by the army votes at the polls, or votes under the army duresse, or votes influenced by the money in the hands of multitudes of contractors and agents, whose spoil was five millions from the Treasury. On all these failing, the Administration's prime agent, Calhoun, (a name now ominous for slavery,) was prepared with the trick which carried slavery in the Constitution, by the manner in which the ballots were required to be inscribed.

The Lecompton Convention, which met in June, adjourned to meet again on the 19th of October. The regular election of the Territorial Legislature was held about this time, and the

Calhoun Convention adjourned, so as to have the returns before deciding on the mode of submitting the Constitution to the people. The fraudulent returns created an Administration Legislature, which would put the local authority so completely in the hands of Calhoun as to enable it to carry the slavery Constitution without difficulty, if submitted through officials such a Legislature would constitute. The forgery that carried the Legislature would carry the Constitution. Under these circumstances, Calhoun, representing the President, and Martin, who was sent by Thompson and Cobb, were about to have the Constitution undergo this process. But just at this moment, Gov. Walker declared the legislative returns in favor of the President fraudulent, and the Republican majority duly elected. And here was the turning point. The programme of the President, of which Calhoun assured Walker he was duly advised, instantly changed. Martin, the cautious Cabinet agent, gives this account of the sudden change of the first plan of cheating into that last adopted:

"A difficulty sprung up between Governor Walker and a portion of the Convention, within a day or two after it re-assembled, and it finally extended to a majority of the Convention, which really, in my judgment, defeated the submission of the Constitution in its entirety to the people.

"It arose about certificates of election of members of the Territorial Legislature from Douglas and Johnson counties. It was alleged that frauds had been committed at Oxford, and threats of personal violence were made by Lane and his adherents against Walker and Stanton, if they should give certificates to the Democrats claiming to be elected from those counties, who had the certificates of the judges of the election. Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton published a card announcing that they had taken, or would proceed to take, testimony in the case, and if it should appear that fraud had been committed, certificates of election should be awarded to the Republicans; whereupon a *mandamus* was issued by Judge Cato, at the instance of the Democrats claiming to have been elected from those counties, for the purpose of enforcing their right to certificates of election, and thus devolve on the Legislature, the judge of the elections of its own members, the investigation of the question of frauds at Oxford. Governor Walker declined a compliance with the mandate of Judge Cato, and awarded certificates of election to the Republicans. Thereupon some of the extreme anti-submission members of the Convention, with the friends of the thus defeated Democratic candidates for the Legislature, called a meeting to denounce the course of Governor Walker in this matter, and it was held in the hall of the Convention, though at night after the Convention had adjourned. They denounced him in bitter speeches, and passed resolutions of censure upon his conduct, without identifying themselves with or endorsing the frauds, if any had been practiced; taking the ground that Governor Walker and Secretary Stanton were not judges of the election, and had no authority of law for going behind the returns of the judges to inquire into the question of fraud in the election of members, but, if frauds had been practiced, it was a question for the Legislature to settle. That made a breach between the Governor and a large portion of the Convention, which I labored in vain to prevent, and afterwards to heal."

This confession being extracted from the Cabinet emissary, Mr. Olin, of the Covode Committee, then inquires of him: "Do you know who was the author of that provision? (the slavery provision in the Lecompton Constitution?)" Mr. Emissary answers, "I think I drew it myself." Mr. Olin again asks: "Who consulted you about drawing it up?" Answer: "General Calhoun, Rush Elmore, and Hugh M. Moore; I do not know whether any others;

we had been associated together upon the out and out plan of submission; and that having failed, the question was, what was best to be done now," &c., &c.

Now, it will be remembered that Calhoun, President of the Convention, was the President's representative, who first told Governor Walker of the change at the White House in regard to the submission of the Constitution, after it was found that the fraudulent Legislature to pass upon it was unseated. And Moore, Vice President, was the man to whom the Cabinet emissary bore his letter of credit from Cobb. These were the managers of the packed Convention, and through whom it was worked like a supple-jack, by the telegraphic wires from Washington city.

Governor Walker deserves credit for turning his back on the whole body at Lecompton engaged in giving effect to the chicanery of the President. He opens up the view to both plans in the passage already quoted, in which he says that this plan to make Kansas a slave State developed itself in the fall of 1857, and he fixes precisely the same moment and the same cause for the Administration's change of front as to the mode of effecting the object, as does the Cabinet emissary. It was when he declared the returns *counterfeit*, that made an Administration Legislature to accomplish its designs and that way to success was closed. That Calhoun, the manager of the grand fraud, was the accomplice of the President in it, is put beyond all doubt by the fact that he was sustained in every movement he made by the President, while they were in progress. That he was sustained by him in the fraud of getting up the Convention, and countenancing it when elected by two thousand votes—the most of them probably fraudulent—and known to be overbalanced by more than ten thousand against it. That he favored both plans, the first and the last urged through Calhoun in that Convention, to impose the slave institution upon a reluctant people. That he sustained the bribery, the violence, the forgery, and perjury, through which Calhoun endeavored to procure a subservient Territorial Legislature, is manifest from the fact that he sustained the Lecompton Constitution, the result of all these villainies, received Calhoun with honor at Washington when driven from Kansas in disgrace, and gave him another office of trust when he dare not return to resume that which he had abandoned.

Governor Walker sustained Calhoun in all his enormities but the last; and that being the one necessary to accomplish all the rest, the President turned him adrift, because he would not obey his representative, Calhoun, instead of the written instructions under his own hand. Although Governor Walker deserves credit for this defiance, there are others who deserve credit for helping him to the resolution.

Two thousand militia of Kansas were em-

bodied and in arms, and had determined not to allow their State to be made the victim of Southern interest or ambition. These men would have set up their own free-State Constitution, voted by the great body of the people, against the Lecompton slave Constitution, the spawn of the vilest prostitution of popular rights.

They had only postponed taking preliminary steps under their free Constitution, as Governor Walker tells the President, under the assurances he had given that they should have a fair vote to decide the fate of that to be prepared by their pro-slavery adversaries. The Governor goes on to say, in his letter to the President, "their Legislature would certainly have passed a complete code of laws, and could have put them in practical operation by the popular will in a large majority of the counties of the Territory, and they will do the same thing next fall, if the Constitution is not submitted to the people. This of course is all wrong; but it would have been done, and would have united all the free-State Democrats with the Republicans, and rendered a bloody collision and a tedious and sanguinary civil war inevitable, requiring the active services of troops in a large majority of our counties certain." And it was this certainty that they would do the same thing next fall, if not treated fairly, which induced Governor Walker to close his letter to the President by this impressive warning: "It will never do to send General Harney to Utah until the difficulties in Kansas are settled. He is a terror to the Black Republicans, and just the man for the occasion." This shows why, under pretence of flying to Utah, there was such hot haste to assemble the troops to be in June at Leavenworth, to cover Calhoun's election of a pro-slavery Convention; why such timely notice was given that they should be detained there to help the Administration in electing the Territorial Legislature by being "a terror to the Black Republican" voters, and afterwards the shield to protect the unhallowed attempt to make them swallow the Lecompton programme in the fall. The President in his private letter of July 12, 1857, extorted by the Covode Committee from Walker, answers thus:

"General Harney has been selected to command the expedition to Utah, but we must *continue* to leave him with you."

[This is as it was taken down from Walker's reading to the Committee. The *National Intelligencer*, which probably obtained a copy from Walker himself, has it, "*Contrive to have him with you.*"]

"at least until you are out of the woods. Kansas is vastly more important, at the present moment, than Utah. The pressure continues upon me without intermission. I pray that Divine Providence, in which I place my trust, may graciously preserve my life and health until the end of my term; but God's holy will be done in any event.

"With every sentiment of esteem, I remain always sincerely your friend, JAMES BUCHANAN."

This prayer, altogether for himself, when poor Walker was not "out of the woods," but

in the midst of its dangers, looks rather selfish in the man who put him there. But the greatest sinner has the greatest need of prayers, and the man needed them most who had meditated and matured a policy to overthrow the principle on which American liberty is founded, a policy which the friend he had placed in the post of danger declared was leading to "*a disastrous revolution and civil war, which would undoubtedly have extended to the bordering States of Iowa and Missouri, and which I think would have extended throughout the Union.*" The bloody collision between the troops and the people embodied to defeat the frauds which had put down their right of suffrage, and put up a false Legislature, was arrested by Governor Walker; and President Buchanan was obliged to bring his Lecompton bantling, disavowed by four-fifths of the voters at the polls, and booted by the local Legislature, into Congress for adoption. Its fate in Congress is well known. All the Administration could do, by corruption and by party drill over its organized majority in both branches, could not avail. It was rejected for bastardy by a portion of the Democrats and by all the Republicans in Congress.

Then the Administration produced the English bill to keep Kansas out of the Union, and out of the Presidential election, the old public functionary believing that his last chance for re-election would be in the House of Representatives, through division of the electoral vote, and there Kansas, if admitted, would count as much against him as the Empire State. The Lecompton Constitution had been lost by twenty-four Democrats uniting with the Republicans in the vote against it. The recovery of more than half these Administration recusants was necessary to cover the President's retreat into this English bulwark against Kansas. The English bill was the measure through which the President hoped to escape the odium in the South of introducing Kansas as a free State during his first term, a thing likely to extinguish the support he knew to be essential to bring him forward for a second. He therefore, as will be seen from the testimony before the Covode Committee, exerted his influence through corrupt agents to operate on the members of his party who deserted him on the Lecompton bill, to bring them back on the English bill.

In passing the English bill, he found an agent, in Cornelius Wendell, more sagacious and effective and not more scrupulous than he had found in General Calhoun, the President of the Convention charged with the Lecompton measure.

Wendell's management, as exhibited by himself on oath before the Covode Committee, deserves to be studied by the country. It passes before the eye in a sort of *camera obscura*, the operation of the Executive machinery on Congress under high pressure, and directed by a skilful engineer. The morals of the Administration as well as its politics, as presented in

these behind-the-curtain scenes, will be found full of admonition. Wendell was a printer, and seems to have studied his profession as a black art, rather than one to spread light. He was indoctrinated in fraud by the Democracy of the lower Empire, which he introduced at Washington, on a larger scale than ever known before, as the system of log-rolling and bribery in Congress. With unabashed frankness, and something of pride of achievement, he describes his mode of managing Congress; observing a delicacy in regard to the exposure of individuals whom he seduced, that wears an air of gallantry.

He was liberal, too. His bank accounts, examined by the Committee, show a vast expenditure. They could not ascertain how it was applied, because, as Wendell deposed, he had "entered them on his book intentionally in such a way that he was not able to explain them." He adds: "I disguised them as much as I could, not only with regard to the parties, but as to the entire facts. I have a distinct impression that the money I paid for services rendered in the passage of that bill (the English bill) exceed **THIRTY THOUSAND DOLLARS.**" The chairman interrupted him. (See page 215.) Question: "I believe you stated, in your former testimony, that, during the pendency of the Lecompton or English bill, you had very frequent conversations with the President and the members of the Cabinet, and that they did not give you any express or positive directions relative to the using of money to carry the bill; was not the impression made on your mind, in those interviews, from all that took place between you and them, that, if you did use your money, you would be cared for and reimbursed in Government patronage? Was not that impression made on your mind from all the interviews between the President, members of the Cabinet, and yourself?" Answer: "Yes, sir. The general idea left on my mind was, that if I exerted myself in favor of the passage of that bill, I would be properly considered thenceforward during the term of the Administration."

Mr. Wendell, in subjecting the members fixed on to the views of the Administration, did not offer direct bribes to them himself. He selected influential agents in their own States to operate on them. In Ohio, where there were several whose defection on the Lecompton fraud was to be cured by corruption, a Mr. Bean, an editor of influence in some of their districts, was selected. Wendell took him in hand, and Bean's testimony thus shows the result:

"Question. What conversation had you with Mr. Wendell at the time he proposed to give you \$20,000?

"Answer. That grew out of my gassing with Reynolds, my joking and plaguing him; he proposed, if I would take the contract, to give me \$20,000. Here is a memorandum which he made and handed to me when he left me, or during the first conversation, I do not now remember which it was. In place of telling it, he wrote it down, while I was looking on. Says he: 'Here is what I will do,' and then wrote this: '\$5d —, \$5-30 —, \$5-60 —, \$5-90 —.'

"The understanding was, that this was \$0,000 apiece. I

said, "I would rather take the \$5,000 down, and not take the contract."

"By Mr. OLIN:

"Question. Was this \$5,000 apiece for four men?

"Answer. I forget the number of men who were needed to pass the bill, or raise the committee, whichever it was."

Bean swears he appropriated the \$5,000 to his own use, but it turned out that the members to be converted were converted. He says, on further examination, in answer to the question, "Did you know any other parties who were engaged here as outsiders in helping to get the Lecompton bill passed?" Answer: "There were plenty of them." He mentions, among those "who urged members to vote for that bill," Colonel Medary, Mr. Johnson, candidate for Marshal, old Colonel Sawyer, J. K. Miller, Judge Kennon, A. J. Dickenson, also candidate for United States Marshal. These men were not Bean's nor Wendell's men. They were marshaled by the Administration—one being made a Governor, and others receiving its patronage in other shapes. Mr. Wendell's men, engaged in the same business, were influential persons connected with the press, and having access to the members as reporters around the purlieus of the Capitol. To a Mr. Walker, correspondent of the New York *Express*, he gave \$2,500; to a Mr. Hay he gave in notes some sixteen thousand dollars. He was intimate and influential with the members both from the States of Pennsylvania and New York.

Mr. OLIN asks Mr. Wendell: "Was it not talked over and canvassed, who was most likely to be influenced?" Mr. Wendell replies: "Yes, sir; I presume it was." Question: "Then the money was designed for these peculiar subjects?" Answer: "Very probably it was." Question: "It strikes me that money would hardly have been paid without some definite object or purpose to be accomplished with the money?" Answer: "The object was accomplished, and the money was paid." There are about two hundred and twenty pages of testimony obtained by COVODE, and all point to the conclusion thus laconically given by Mr. Wendell in a single line.

The enormous receipts and expenditures of Mr. Buchanan's Printer to the Executive Departments is a matter of wonder, compared with Mr. Van Buren's time. Mr. Wendell, the purchaser, and at one time sole owner, of the official organ, and its paymaster even after he had disposed of it, upon an understanding that he was to receive the Executive patronage as the price for his paper and contribution to its support, received, as shown by his bank account alone, \$929,000. In answer to the question, "How large were your profits on that work?" (printing for the Government.) Answer: "I think I made over one hundred thousand dollars one year." Question: "Did you not, for political purposes, within the last three or four years, use a much larger amount of money than you used on previous occasions—some hundred thousand dollars?" Answer:

"My impression is, that it was about one hundred and twenty-eight or one hundred and thirty thousand dollars."

Mr. Alexander, a Democrat, and a printer for eight or ten years employed in the Executive printing, in his testimony before Covode's Committee, shows that now-a-days the public functionaries can make the amount of printing almost what they please. The enormous aggregate, the growth of the present Presidential term, sustains Mr. Alexander's statement, made on oath; and this fact makes a comparison of the expenditure under Mr. Van Buren's (the last really Democratic Administration) with that of Mr. Buchanan's, (which it may be hoped is the last of the spurious ones, assuming and abusing the Democratic name,) a most important means in discriminating the true from the counterfeit Democracy. Economy is the great test of honesty in Government, and honesty is the main ingredient in Democracy rightly understood. It is a mere trusteeship, managing the concerns of the people according to their will. Now, the Government printing, which the President and his partisans in Congress, when controlling, may employ to enlighten the public by honest official intelligence, may be used to corrupt the press, the organ of public opinion, by jobs and largesses. The testimony before the Committee proves that Mr. Buchanan used it not only for this purpose, but also to assist his political intrigues, by applying funds obtained through contracts filching money from the Treasury by false constructions of the law, to keep up a third party organization to defeat the will of the majority of the people by distracting their votes. A look back on such developments, in Covode's report, gives great significance to the contrast in the amount drawn from the Treasury for printing in Mr. Van Buren's term and that in Mr. Buchanan's; especially as there never was an imputation of fraud attached to Mr. Van Buren, and it has been proved on Mr. Buchanan.

The printing of Congress, including paper, during the four years of Mr. Van Buren's Administration, amounted to \$506,284.96, which is made up as follows:

Twenty-fifth Congress.

Senate, (Blair & Rives).....	\$88,588.19
House, (Thomas Alton).....	231,017.16
Aggregate.....	319,605.35

Twenty-sixth Congress.

Senate, (Blair & Rives).....	\$76,601.52
House, (Blair & Rives).....	111,078.00
Aggregate.....	187,679.61

The printing of the Thirty-fifth Congress, including paper, the first two years of Mr. Buchanan's Administration, amounts to \$669,713.07, which is 32 per cent. more than it amounted to during the four years of Mr. Van Buren's Administration.

If the printing of this (the Thirty-sixth) Congress shall amount to as much as the Thirty-

fifth Congress—and from present appearances it will amount to at least as much—then the printing of Congress during the four years of Mr. Buchanan's Administration will amount to \$1,236,426.14—which is double, and 64 per cent. over, approaching triple, what it amounted to during the four years of Mr. Van Buren's Administration.

The amount paid by the Government for printing blanks, including paper, for the Post Office Department, during the four years of Mr. Van Buren's Administration, is \$124,899.99, as appears from the Official Register of 1839 and 1841, showing an average expenditure of \$31,224.99 a year.

The amount paid by the Government for printing blanks, including paper, for the Post Office Department, to be sent to postmasters, during the two first years of Mr. Buchanan's Administration, as is shown by the testimony of Mr. Offutt, of the Sixth Auditor's office, and Mr. Heart, Superintendent of Public Printing, is \$146,475.67, which is at the rate of \$73,237.83 a year, which is double as much, and 34 per cent. more than was paid a year during Mr. Van Buren's Administration.

The \$31,224.99 a year expended under Mr. Van Buren's Administration includes the amount paid for printing blanks used in the General Post Office Department, as well as those sent out to postmasters, to be used by them. The \$73,237.83 expended by Mr. Buchanan's Administration a year does not include the blanks used in the General Post Office, but only those sent to postmasters. We have no means of ascertaining the amount paid for blanks used in the General Post Office, nor in any of the other Executive Departments of the Government, during Mr. Buchanan's Administration.

The testimony of Mr. Alexander (for nine or ten years a contractor for printing under the Departments) explains how this extraordinary increase has grown up under a profligate Administration. Mr. Alexander replies to a question, "What is the probable amount of printing?" Answer: "They can make it almost any amount they please; it depends entirely upon the Department. They can cut out an order at any time they think proper, and say that the exigencies of the Department or the good of the public interest requires that certain binding or printing should be done, and it is ordered to be done."

The question was, "whether you know what the printing and binding of the different Departments have amounted to a year, during Mr. Buchanan's Administration?" Answer: "I cannot say that I have examined, critically, to ascertain the amount; but I should think the binding, to the best of my knowledge, would amount to \$100,000 any how. I speak of all the Departments." Question: "Is the printing as large an item as the binding?" Answer: "O! the printing is a much larger item." To another question he replies:

"The printing is a much larger item than the binding, and the Departments can make it almost as profitable as they please."

Congress, to prevent the growth of this great abuse, exacted that the Executive Departments should contract for the binding only with practical bookbinders; but this was disregarded by the Departments. A leading and very honest bookbinder appealed to the President. He pretended to refer it for the opinion of the Attorney General. The bookbinder followed it. The Attorney General said the President had not referred it. On examining the papers, they were endorsed by the President, referred to the Attorney General, *but not for his opinion*. The bookbinder told this to the President; he expressed surprise; told him to go to the Attorney General, and tell him to give you his opinion in reference to the law. Tell him I say so. The Attorney responds to the suitor: "You know, Mr. Pettibone, I cannot give you the opinion unless the request is made in writing;" but, he added, "I will see the President to day, and will ask him about it." The honest mechanic calls again on the Attorney General, Judge Black. "He had seen the President, and he declined interfering." Mr. Pettibone again approaches the President, and said: "Mr. President, did I understand you aright? You assured me I should have the opinion of the Attorney General upon a certain law; now Judge Black informs me that you decline allowing him to give an opinion." The President replies: "He informed you correctly; I do decline."

Thus our high dignitaries, sworn to administer the law, violate it so grossly that they dare not put on paper a pretext for their conduct. They are too high for the law, yet stoop to mean double-dealing, to evade the just claim of an honest citizen, and, to escape responsibility, refuse to give an official form to the transaction. The one hundred thousand dollars per annum went to Wendell's corruption fund of millions. According to law, it ought to have gone to practical mechanics of the book-binding craft, some of whom offered to do it for one-third of the price given to Wendell, and were recommended for it by an honesty and responsibility vouched for before the Committee by some of the most respectable men of the city. From this it will be seen, that the mode of supply was in keeping with the motives that guided the application of public money.

But Mr. Wendell's was open and round dealing, *on his principles*, with members of Congress, and decent and polite, too. That of the Administration was full of duplicity and cunning, overbearing and unjust, then truckling and yielding and corrupt throughout. All this is displayed in the case of Mr. Cox, of Ohio, casually brought to light by the Cyclope Committee in looking into the management of the English bill. Mr. Cox was among the first in the House to break ground against the Lecompton Constitution. The wrath

of the Executive at once made him an example of its vengeance. Mr. Miller, of Columbus, his special friend, had received the lucrative post office of the city, to reward him and his friend Cox for zealous service in that hard-fought district, ousting its Republican Representative from Congress. The refusal of Cox to sanction the Lecompton frauds was instantly followed by the dismissal of his friend Miller from the post office, the place that marked him with Administration confidence, and made him its leader at the capital of the State. And what made it worse, Medary, who was unfriendly to both Cox and Miller, was made Postmaster. This fixed Cox as a Douglas partisan and defier of the Administration. But when the English bill was put forward to exclude Kansas, it was found that Cox's vote was necessary to carry it. General Wilson, a Democrat, and son-in-law to Medary, of the *Ohio Statesman*, was solicited, by the then Postmaster General Brown, to see Cox to get his vote. The witness, Wilson, says:

"Governor Brown wished me to call upon the member of Congress from my district, Mr. Cox, and say to him that he would be very glad if he would vote for the English bill. He told me to press it upon him, and desired me to say further to him, that if he would vote for the English bill, he would be received into high favor with the Post Office Department, and bygones would be bygones."

"Question. Proceed, if you please; what else occurred?

"Answer. I called upon Mr. Cox, and told him what had been said by the Postmaster General.

"Question. What was his reply to it?

"Answer. Mr. Cox said he had not made up his mind upon the subject, but he would make up his mind, and no doubt it would be all right. That was all he said. I got no satisfaction from Mr. Cox. Mr. Cox and myself were not on the best terms, growing out of the removal of Mr. Cox's friend, Mr. Miller, from the post office, and the putting in of my father in-law, (Colonel Medary.)"

How cunning in that celebrated intriguer, Postmaster General Brown, (Aaron Vicarious, as Benton called him,) to send, as the peacemaker, the son-in-law of the man put in the post office, (the Headsman of the *Statesman*,) for the express purpose of arming him to destroy Cox in his district! But this was not all. Medary was himself called to Washington, to brandish his battle-axe in the eyes of poor Cox. He had returned from his Governorship to Minnesota, where he had been employed in making a Legislature on the pattern of the Lecompton Convention, and returning two false Senators to Congress. He had sold out the *Statesman* on taking the Minnesota Governorship, but being called to Washington to scare Cox, and being appointed Postmaster at Columbus, he resolved to buy, or make a feint of buying back, that party engine of torture. The Committee interrogated him about this, and he answered:

"There was a strong application made to me buy out the *Ohio Statesman* again. During the pendency of the matter, (English bill,) I went home, and made inquiry to see whether I could buy it or not; but I could not. But that had nothing to do with influencing members of Congress, but to exorcise those we did not think inclined to keep in the ranks."

In answer to another interrogatory about this preparation to start papers in Ohio for the Administration, against the recreant members, he adds:

"It is probable that a great deal of the stories going about grew out of this matter, (his buying the *Statesman*,) or something of the kind; but it had nothing to do with buying members of Congress, but was meant to exorcise some of them. I did not want to buy them, but I wanted 'to put them through,' as the saying is."

Cox was still in doubt, when Medary left to get ready his machine to "put him through," as well as the rest of his Ohio confreres. Cox held out to the very eve of the vote. He consulted his friends, who called a meeting of the Douglas leaders. One of them, a witness before the Committee, (a Mr. Geiger,) after stating that Cox had written to them a letter of two sheets against the bill, adds, "he desired to ascertain whether, if he breasted the current, we would stand by him. We consulted a long while about the matter, but finally telegraphed to Mr. Cox to vote against the English bill, and go no further than to take Mr. Quintman's amendment. That telegraphic dispatch was signed by the whole of us. Mr. Cox telegraphed in reply, that night, 'I breathe easier—Douglas will break ground against it to-morrow; break ground, or come out against it rough shod, or something of that kind.' Well, the morrow came, and Mr. Cox voted for the English bill."

The mystery is unravelled by the testimony taken before the Committee. Dickerson, the candidate for Marshal, went to Cox while he was threatened with defeat by Medary and the Administration power in his district on one hand, and coaxed by Postmaster General Brown on the other. And Dickerson (as Bean swears) "told me himself that he helped to manage the matter with Mr. Cox;" and how, will be seen from results. General Geiger, one of the leaders whom he consulted about his course, afterwards upbraided him for his defiance of his constituents' instructions; when, to conciliate him, Cox proposed to give him an appointment to go to New Mexico, to adjust some two hundred and fifty or three hundred thousand dollars worth of Government claims; told him he had met the President and one of his Cabinet, who "congratulated him on having voted in that way," (for the English bill,) saying, "they thought it had saved the country and party." Then Mr. Buchanan said "there were probably some vacancies in the Interior Department, and if he had any friends, there might be some places for them." After this, he proposed the commission to New Mexico, to settle claims amounting to two hundred and fifty or three hundred thousand dollars. He replied, "I would look rather scaly in going back home after taking the office under James Buchanan, after the manner in which I had spoken of him, publicly, and the opinion that I had of him." General Geiger adds, "I told Mr. Cox I was very much obliged to him for his kindness in offering me the place; and as he had been so courteous, I wanted to give him a little advice, that whatever patronage he had to dispense, he should hold in his own fist until after the election in the fall, and not have

any appointment until after he had gone through the contest, because he would in all probability be the nominee of the party, and it would weaken his standing very much. *He would be charged with being bought!*"

Mr. Cox acted upon the suggestion of this sagacious Democrat, who spurned the share offered him in the spoils. He kept the re-appointment of his friend Miller back, until after his re-election in October. Then, the whole arrangement that brought Cox over to the bill, to defraud Kansas of her place in the Union, was revealed. Oregon, with a little more than half her population, was made a State, to bring General Lane into the Senate; but Kansas was kept out, that she might have no voice there or in the choice of President. She was compelled to receive Medary as Governor, he resigning the post office at Columbus to Cox's friend, Miller, and giving his consent that his enemy, Miller, with whom he made friends, might buy a partnership in his old paper, the *Statesman*, have his good will in it, without which Miller said it would be worthless; and there was a promise that six thousand dollars worth of patronage should follow the paper, it being "stipulated that it should give an acceptable support to the Administration." This capitulation was in writing, and signed by Medary and Cox. Miller says, in his testimony, trying to cover up this bargain, that Medary threw this in "after we had settled our difficulties, and shaken hands upon it, and felt pretty good," &c. The Committee could not get at the paper signed by Cox and Medary, but Mr. Smith says the promise was not made good about the six thousand dollars, and makes it very clear that, in his opinion, it was withheld because he, the partner with Miller, and the editor, would not give the "acceptable support."

It seems, from testimony before the Covode Committee, that the President was extremely sensitive to attack on his Kansas policy and Lecompton frauds, in such leading papers as the *Statesman*, in Columbus, and Forney's *Press*, in Philadelphia. The editor of the *Statesman* refused his support to those frauds, and lost the \$6,000 bid; Mr. Forney denounced these frauds in his paper, and, soon after, the Attorney General (Black,) through Mr. Webster, a lawyer of standing in Philadelphia, proposed to buy off Forney's opposition. Webster, a strong Administration man, had been solicitous to have Forney in favor with the Administration, and wrote so to the President's intimate friend, Attorney General Black. On this hint, Black posts off this note:

"December 18, 1857.

"MY DEAR SIR: There is no definite nor indefinite arrangement made of the affair to which you refer. If you desire to do your highly-valued friend a great service, you should come here immediately. I have long desired to see you. Please to come. If you won't come, say so by telegraph. Yours, ever,

J. S. BLACK."

This was a very cunning letter, and Webster came. Webster gives this account of the interview to the Committee:

"I came on here, and we had a long conversation upon the subject. He stated to me that it was evident that Col. Forney's course would ultimately land him with the Opposition unless it was stopped, and predicted that his bones would whiten on the shore of Black Republicanism, along with the bones of Wilmot. He was very desirous, indeed, that Col. Forney should give some pledge in his newspaper that he meant to remain with the Democratic party. He said he wanted a paragraph no larger than the palm of my hand, in which Col. Forney should simply say, that while this question had arisen, and was a serious one, it was one, nevertheless, to be settled within the Democratic organization; that it was a fair subject for difference, but not for opposition; and he would abide by the decision of the Democratic party upon that subject, as soon as that decision might become known. I asked him, 'What then?' Well, he said, he was disposed then to do whatever was in his power in aid of Col. Forney's paper. I asked, what about the post office blanks? He said that Col. Forney, with this assurance, could have the printing of them. This contract was valued by Col. Forney's friends at about \$80,000. I asked Judge Black what portion of the printing of the post office blanks would be given to him. He said, the whole of it. I then remarked, 'Well, now, are you able, in case this thing is accomplished, to fulfill what you promise? Will there be no disappointment about it?' He gave me to understand that he, of course, would not hold such a conversation with me, without it was in his power to fulfill all he did promise."

The witness gives this as the result of the proposition:

"Col. Forney indignantly refused to comply with Judge Black's wishes, and was very emphatic in expressing his refusal."

This was the second attempt of the President to disarm Forney, whose position in Philadelphia he feared. Wendell gives the facts thus to Covode's Committee, touching the President's first effort to relieve himself of Forney's apprehended opposition:

"Question. Did you not carry a large sum of money, for a considerable length of time, to give to Col. Forney, in the event of his accepting the place abroad? If so, state how much, and for what length of time you carried it.

"Answer. I carried \$10,000, for the purpose of giving it to him, for some three weeks—nineteen days, if my memory serves me, I think it was.

"Question. By whose authority or instructions?

"Answer. Well, sir, it might be said to be by the President's.

"Mr. WINSLOW. Give us facts, now.

"By the CHAIRMAN:

"Question. You will state the facts, if you please.

"Answer. The President was desirous to have Mr. Forney go abroad, and tendered him, as I understood from him, either the Liverpool consulate, or the Berlin or Vienna mission, one of the two. In a conversation as to amount of compensation he would receive if he went abroad, the suggestion was made that he might participate in the public printing. And, after several conversations, it was agreed that he should have a certain amount of the printing, which should make his salary equal to \$20,000 or \$25,000 per annum. This difference, over what his salary would be, was to be paid from the public printing. Mr. Forney declined at first, and, among other reasons, stated his inability, in a financial point of view, to leave. I finally agreed to raise \$10,000 in advance for him, and did raise it; and, as I stated before, I carried the money for nineteen days, until he at last totally refused to go."

It appears that Wendell was indeed the purse bearer of the President, for, in answer to another question, "Were you authorized to guarantee, or did you do so on your own responsibility, that the amount of his pay should be \$20,000 or \$25,000?" he answered, "I was in a measure authorized to make an arrangement to pay him some sum out of the proceeds of the public printing."

"Question. Authorized by whom?

"Answer. By the President."

It is important to remark the consequence of this mode, adopted by the President, of

taking money from the proceeds of contracts, by arrangement with contractors, and applying it to his own private purposes. It is seen already, from the testimony of Mr. Alexander, who had been printer for some years to the Executive Departments, that they could make the printing amount to what they pleased, and that, under their construction of the law, it yielded 50 per cent. net profit; and of this profit, the President and his subalterns took the lion's share. In an instance given by Wendell, he being the manager, the profits, at 43 per cent., amounted to \$15,165.26; and of this, under instructions, he gave \$9,707.28 to the *Pennsylvanian*, and \$5,400 to the *Philadelphia Argus*. Here, under the shadow of a contract with an individual, yielding \$15,000 beyond the sum for which the work was executed, this sum was literally embezzled for personal uses designated by the President. When the President, through his Secretaries, makes contracts without letting to the lowest bidder, or, where so let, they assume, as they often do, to set the lowest bid aside, and give it to a favorite at a higher bid, they can make this disposable profit what they please, ascertaining what the work will cost, and then adding to the contract such an extra profit as will satisfy the contractor, and leave the requisite surplus for their own purposes. But, in the case of the post office blanks, the price of printing being fixed by law, (one dollar per one thousand sheets,) fraud was connived at, or rather perpetrated, by our public "functionaries," old and young, to give the Executive a large electioneering fund. There happens to be no composition or setting up type necessary in these blanks, a few inches in size. A form is cast, which is in fact but one type, and is always kept ready by the printers of these blanks, among his materials, ready to go to press. Mr. Rives, being sworn, deposed before the Committee, that when this work was done by him, he never charged for composition, because there was none, but only for press-work and paper. But the present Administration assumed that, every time blanks were ordered and sheets were struck, though no types were actually set up, it must be presumed; and so they called for blanks three or six times a day, or oftener, just as they desired to augment the surplus fund they derived from the contractor for the blanks. Since Mr. King's exposure of the fraud through the Senate's Committee, the abuse has been abated, and the printing of the post office blanks is now done by contract at a deduction of 94 $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., or for 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ cents on the dollar of the late prices for Executive printing. For what purposes this easy-gotten money was sometimes disbursed,

through Mr. Buchanan's purse-bearer, Wendell, will be seen from the replies of Mr. Megargee to interrogatories before Mr. King's Committee:

"Question. Did you receive any money for political purposes in Pennsylvania or New Jersey from Mr. Wendell?"

"Witness. Am I really compelled to answer such questions?"

"Mr. KENNEDY. I think it is within the scope of the inquiry."

"The Committee thought the question was a proper one, and that it should be answered."

"Answer. I did, sir, receive money, at various times, for political purposes."

"Question. Were those moneys expended for the promotion of the interests of the Democratic party?"

"Answer. Not all of them. Some of it was used for a third party, which was organized to divert votes from what was known as the 'People's party' with us. The 'People's party' was in opposition to the Democratic party. We did not know there the party organized as the 'Republican party.' The opposition to the Democratic party was called the 'People's party'; and to divert votes from that party, the third party was organized. The object was to divide the 'People's party'."

"Question. Was such a third party organized?"

"Answer. Yes, sir."

"Question. Did you believe that was necessary to the success of the Democratic party?"

"Answer. We certainly did, or we should not have given them the money."

"Question. What was that third party called?"

"Answer. The straight American party; the 'straight-outs'."

"Question. You speak both of Pennsylvania and New Jersey?"

"Answer. Yes, sir."

"Question. And of those States only?"

"Answer. Yes, sir; of those only."

* Here we see Mr. Buchanan repeating the game played in making him President. Money was used, on the eve of the Presidential election, to keep up the organization of the Fillmore straight-out Americans in Philadelphia, to prevent them from uniting their strength with the party of freedom, to which they were drawn by principle. Heartless leaders were hired to urge the party discipline on the Americans, to defeat their wishes, and make that man President whom they most abhorred. And so we find this system of corruption and intrigue strenuously pursued under Mr. Buchanan as a policy. Mr. King's report from the Senate Committee thus groups the facts given in proof of this policy:

"Besides these large sums paid by the printer who executed the printing, as bonus for the contracts, large sums were paid out of the printing money to be expended in elections to influence their results. Mr. Wendell testifies that he contributed, directly or indirectly, \$100,000 during the four years; and Mr. Wendell, during the four years ending March, 1859, executed the public printing. He contributed for different Congressional districts in Pennsylvania, for the elections—in Colonel Florence's district, \$2,200; in J. Glancy Jones's district, \$1,000, but Jones was defeated; in Millward's district, \$500. He also contributed in White's, Riley's, and Landy's districts. Mr. Wendell testifies that it was known to the Executive Departments that he was a contributing agent; that the President was cognizant of the fact that he was spending money liberally, though he never mentioned to him the exact amount in any particular district. He said he had on his books an item of \$1,500 which he contributed in New York; that he went up the river, and contributed, among others, in Mr. Nevins's district; that he

* Megargee shows how the American vote of Pennsylvania was dissipated to relieve Buchanan of their opposition in the State election of 1856. Laterty, a member of the Democratic Executive Committee, and friend of Buchanan, most reluctantly proves that more than 5,000 forged naturalization papers were used to carry the State in that election for Buchanan. His plurality was 2,200. The foreign vote on forged papers gave him the State vote and the Presidency. His friend, the Collector of Philadelphia, it is proved, sent off a trunk full of these forgeries for use in the interior, and others were sent under the frank of Senator Bigler.—See *Covode's Report*, pages 331 to 403.

also contributed in New Jersey, and some small amounts in Maryland. And Mr. Wendell testifies that, without this public printing, he would not have been able to make the contributions he did."

While this plan of operations was in progress, pending the elections, Wendell was in constant consultation with the President, the latter reading his letters from the several districts to Wendell, and Wendell those received by him. This passage in Wendell's testimony, referring to one occasion, displays the intimate relations between them:

"Question. Do you recollect, on the occasion of your going to see the President, whether it was voluntary, or were you sent for?"

"Answer. I was not sent for. I was up almost daily, with letters. I had a pretty extensive correspondence. I would read to him extracts from my letters and what news I had from different parts of the country where elections were about coming off. The conversations would be of a friendly, political character."

"Question. You state you did not take these letters in your hands. What was the occasion of these letters being alluded to, and the contents read to you?"

"Answer. The idea was to show what the prospects were. They were letters of a general political character, as I inferred from what he told me after looking them over. He had apparently read them all over before I came into the room. They gave an idea of how the cause was progressing."

"Question. Do you recollect whether, in answer or reply to any of these letters, you did send off money?"

"Answer. If my memory serves me, I returned to Philadelphia that evening, or the next evening, with munitions. I think I returned that evening. I had returned home the evening before, and had looked after my business during the day, and went back the same evening to Philadelphia. I was backwards and forwards, pretty actively engaged in preaching the good doctrine."

"By the CHAIRMAN:

"Question. By 'munitions' you mean money, do you?"

"Answer. Yes, sir.

"Question. And you left the evening of the conversation with the President?"

"Answer. Yes, sir.

"By Mr. WINSLOW:

"Question. Will you give the particulars of the conversation?"

"Answer. It was general talk upon the subject of elections and our prospects."

"By Mr. OLIN:

"Question. And the probabilities of carrying the district?"

"Answer. The probabilities of carrying the district in which he was a candidate. And from the conversation, I made up my mind that that district was a gone case; I put it down among the hopeless cases."

"Question. On your return to Washington, subsequently, did you see the President?"

"Answer. I did, sir.

"Question. Did you have any conversation with him upon the subject of the election in Foster's Congressional district?"

"Answer. I did, and informed him what my views were upon the subject. I recollect having a conversation of that kind."

"Question. Did you have any conversation with him upon the subject of what, if any, money should be used in that district?"

"Answer. If my memory serves me, I did. I had a conversation with him; and, if my memory serves me, I told him that it would be useless to do anything in that district; that we were beaten before we commenced there."

"Question. Do you recollect whether, on the occasion of that interview, he handed you any letters in reference to the condition of things in the various districts of Pennsylvania?"

"Answer. I do, sir; I have a recollection that he had several letters, but I could not say positively that one of them was from that district, although that among other districts was the subject of conversation."

Wendell is ruined by the earnest and prodigal zeal with which he devoted himself and means to give effect to Buchanan's corrupt intrigues. Buchanan will retire from the Presi-

dency, like Mr. Polk, a much richer man than he came into it; but whether he will go into private life with a better reputation than Mr. Wendell, is doubtful. Their crimes against the Government were alike. The President was the master, and an accomplice in the sphere assigned to Wendell; but it would be derogatory to him and his Cabinet to suppose the management to maintain their power was confided entirely to their printer. These high officers have appeared on the scene themselves, and shown their great superiority over Wendell, their most active and unhesitating instrument, in all the venal acts calculated to banish probity from the Government, and turn the public agents into dishonest mercenaries. Some signal acts of this sort on the part of the President and Secretaries have been branded with the censure of the House of Representatives by large majorities—respectable men of all parties uniting in the vote.

One of the acts censured by resolution of the House was that of the President and Secretary Toucey, dividing the perquisites of the coal agency between Hunter, a doctor of Reading, Getz, an editor in Reading, and Smith, a man engaged in the omnibus business, Philadelphia. Neither of these men even professed to have a knowledge of the different sorts of coal, and neither of them attended to the purchase, the measurement, or inspection, of the coal purchased for the United States. "The whole business was turned over to Tyler, Stone, & Co., who became at once purchasers for and sellers to the Government." Hunter and Smith divided between them, for this sinecure, \$7,442.92, Getz having the honesty to refuse to share in wages given out of the Treasury for political services. Besides, the Government was cheated in the price of the coal, and under the name of a coal agency. The Committee's report says:

"In addition to this direct loss, the mode of purchase adopted furnished no guarantee against fraud in the quality or the amount of coal, which when delivered on shipboard was not inspected by any officer of the Government."

J. Glancy Jones, our Minister to Austria, is reported by the Committee to the House to have had a hand in this arrangement, being then a member of Congress from the district. It does not appear in proof that he took a share, but from the interest he manifested he may have taken that which Getz refused, for he is reported by the Committee, on making another arrangement for some of his constituents, to have taken some of the money. They "report that Hon. J. Glancy Jones, while a member of this House, entered into a contract with the Reading Forge Company, by which he agreed to procure work for it from the Government, in consideration of which he was to receive five per cent. commission, and that he did receive money from said company for said service," and this in violation of the spirit of the laws cited in the report. "The clear design of these laws was to prevent a member of Congress

from having any pecuniary interest in a contract with any officer of the Government, or in any claim against the Government."

The House of Representatives, by resolution passed by a decisive majority, comprising members of all parties, next censured the Administration for violation of law and mischief to the public service, in a corrupt transaction, of which this is an outline, taken from the Committee's report:

George Plitt, a noted familiar partisan and instrument of Buchanan, entered into written agreement with one Swift, to help him to obtain live-oak contracts from the Government for ten per cent. on the gross amounts of the contracts made. "Pending the Presidential election of 1856, Plitt introduced Swift to Mr. Buchanan, and sought to place him in the very best position he possibly could with the President. Plitt at the time was treasurer of the Democratic State Central Committee of Pennsylvania, and as such received from Swift the sum of \$16,000, of which Swift contributed \$10,000, and received the balance of his immediate friends, to be used in the pending election. After the election, and the Cabinet formed, Plitt introduced Swift to Toucey, telling the Secretary of Swift's advances, and that" (using his own words,) "such gentlemen ought to be patronized, of course;" and, in fact, and "of course," "contracts for live oak were awarded to Swift for 150,000 feet, to be delivered at three of the navy yards. An outstanding contract with a Mr. Blanchard was cancelled, and awarded to Swift in November, 1857. The amount of these contracts is \$232,940," and they were effected under circumstances which make it probable that they were "a foregone conclusion" on the advance of the \$16,000 to Mr. Buchanan's treasurer, Plitt, for operating in his election, of which Toucey, too, was duly apprized by Plitt, on introducing Swift to him. It is not to be believed that Toucey would have been guilty of the violation of law in the transaction, and the false pretences to which he resorted to cover it, unless he had been made sensible that the President had come under positive obligations, which he was compelled to make such sacrifices to discharge.

The law is, that "all purchases, &c., made by or under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, shall be made either by open purchase or by previously advertising for proposals respecting the same, &c. Purchases in open market cannot be resorted to except in case of such articles as are wanted for use so immediate as not to admit of contracts by advertisement."

To get round these imperative provisions, and enable Swift to realize on his advance of sixteen thousand dollars contingent on Buchanan's election large profits without competition, the following plan was adopted: "Prior to June, 1858, (says the Report,) Swift brought to some of the navy yards large quantities of tim-

ber, which was rejected—some of it because the size was below that prescribed by the contract, and some for its inferior quality. By rule of the Department, at most of the navy yards, timber not coming within the contract was required to be removed before that which had been accepted would be paid for." The timber Swift wanted to get rid of was exempted from the rule, and his first effort was to get the Secretary to buy it upon open purchase, but he decided he could not, because it was not "for immediate use." The Secretary then ascertaining, from his chief clerk of his bureau, "the shortest time within which the timber could be cut and transported to the various navy yards, made his advertisement for such short time that nobody could deliver in time to compete with Swift, and the kind of timber described was such as Swift had in the yards. The lumbermen saw this fraud in the advertisement, and one of them, Mr. Brown, of Maine, (called as a witness,) says he told Swift that he "knew it was got out for his benefit." The witness says:

"I advised him, for his own reputation, to go to the Secretary and induce him to withdraw that advertisement, and let him purchase his timber, if he wanted it for immediate use. He told me that he had been trying to induce the Secretary to do that same thing, but the Secretary told him that he had no authority to purchase this timber. He had made up his mind that he could not do it without advertising; but the advertising arrangement was such that nobody could offer for it but himself, because he had timber in the yards, and he knew that no other man could fill the offer, and it would only be trifling to make any offer. I stated to Mr. Swift that I should make an offer to take the contract in good faith, and then should ask the Secretary for an extension of time; says he, 'he will not grant it.' 'Well, then,' said I, 'let him do that, and I will report the thing to Congress next winter.'"

Several other lumbermen, not supposing the Secretary would enforce an impossibility, but would allow a delivery of the timber at any time within the six months prescribed for the whole, made proposals, reducing the price below that of Swift's, \$28,000, and the proof was that it would have been \$25,000 more if the usual terms of one or two years, for delivery, had been advertised, being \$53,000 less than Swift's. Toucey encouraged some of them, who said they "were ready to do what other contractors had done to meet the wants of the Government, and asked whether one of their firm had not better go into Florida and ascertain what the wants of Government were there; to which the Secretary replied, that he had better do so, and report to the Government. Before he returned, however, the contract had been awarded to Swift."

"During all this time, (while lower bidders were employed, in doing what on other occasions had obtained an extension of time in the usual long term contracts,) Swift remained in Washington, in confidence that he would finally get the contracts. He assured Bigler 'that he was satisfied that the parties would have to give them up. The Government was under obligations to him, and he thought he could bring such influence to bear that they would give him these contracts. He said it was due to him for services rendered.'

The fraudulent design of the advertisement had become so visible that the Secretary was compelled to abandon it, and, in giving the

contract to Swift, he at last resorted to that of open purchase, which in the beginning he rejected, when proposed by Swift, because "it was against law to buy timber upon open purchase, except for immediate use," and, to bolster this pretence, alleges that there were fears of a rupture with Great Britain when the advertisement was issued. To this, the Committee reply, "that in September, when the contract was made, our relations with Great Britain were certainly as harmonious as they have ever been at any time." And to show how unfounded was the statement that "the contract was made to supply the pressing and immediate wants of the Government," the Committee say "they have directed their attention to that subject," and say that the naval constructor at Norfolk testifies that "they have used up to this time (March 18, 1859) less than one thousand feet of Swift's timber, and that they have on hand five hundred thousand feet. At Kittery, the wants of the Government were supplied by open purchase from Bigler of three thousand feet, and at Pensacola Degraw had arranged with the naval constructor for the few sticks for immediate use, and for the balance as needed." This shows how fallacious is the Secretary's pretence, that he was obliged to supply demands in 1858 by open purchase from Swift. The report of the Committee adds:

"In June, 1857, a greater necessity for timber existed than when the contracts were awarded to Swift, and yet the usual advertisement was then issued. It is worthy of observation, moreover, that at Pensacola, where the Secretary informs us the wants of the service were most pressing, Swift had no timber, and did not deliver it as soon as the lowest bidders could have done."

Although the Secretary was compelled, by the unexpected bids, to reduce Swift to the lowest bid obtained, and in terms meant to deter bidders, yet he got, besides the usual profits made on such a contract, the \$25,000 which the straitened terms of six months instead of two years made contractors add to their bids; but, as he sold rejected timber at these high rates, the contract was in fact a gift of the whole money. It was probably the bargain on which the \$16,000 for the Presidential election was advanced. Yet Swift was not content with this advantage. He refused to pay poor Plitt his per centum on this scandalous transaction, and Plitt thereupon consulted the President. The result of this conference is thus stated by him:

"I did not want to involve the present Administration in any difficulty, and therefore I asked the President whether there would be any objection to my prosecuting Mr. Swift in court for this claim. The President looked at the agreement made in 1854, and said he could not see any objection to it. He had, of course, no advice to give, and told me I might do as I pleased about it."

The President saw no impropriety in Plitt selling out his favor in anticipation for means to make it available; and having realized his part of the speculation in reaching power, employed it in paying Swift out of the Treasury his \$16,000 with usury, and compounded it for

risks, &c. He saw no reason why a court should not adjudge the pimp entitled to the stipulated wages of corruption.

Another most fatal abuse censured by the House was the prostitution of the navy yard, to bring the hired force concentrated in it to defeat the popular will in elections. The great establishments, in our cities, where millions are expended by the Government, turned into recruiting rendezvous for Administration members of Congress. The Committee "the Expenditures for the Navy Department" gives Brooklyn navy yard as an example, showing how completely it is converted from a naval into a political establishment—the whole concern being put under the charge of members of Congress, instead of naval officers, as formerly. The report states:

"The division of patronage among members was known in the yard. Each master workman under whom he and each of his fellows served their apprenticeship, the master engineer, the master plumber, the master block maker, represented Mr. Sickles; the master painter represented Mr. Scantling; the master maker, master blacksmith, and number inspector, represented Mr. MacLay; the master laborer under the master ship-carpenter, represented Mr. Taylor; the master caulkier represented Mr. Cochrane; and the master stone-cutter represented Mr. Wurd. Until May, 1858, the master laborer under the construction engineer represented Mr. Clark, and the master carpenter represented Mr. Haskin, and so with all the heads of the departments of labor in the yard at Brooklyn."

When Messrs. Haskin and Clark voted against the Lecompton fraud of the Administration, their recruiting sergeants were superseded by the partisans of aspirants who supported the fraud. The Committee give the following letter from JOHN COCHRANE to a master carpenter in the navy, showing the absolute authority exerted by members of Congress over the workmen in a local election which should be controlled by local citizens:

"NEW YORK, June 14, 1857.

"MR. COHANE: Mr. Cullen tells me that you are to take men on out Tuesday. Now, I ask you to take him on, and the others I have asked you to take on. I will have my proportion of men under you; if you do not give them, I will lodge charges against you. You have turned away all the men but one from my district already. Of this I have complained to the Secretary, and now, unless you testify this injustice, I will make application that you be turned out. The better will bring me an answer."

"Yours, &c., JOHN COCHRANE."

Letters of Dan Sickles, among others, are exhibited, calling on the Secretary to remove the heads of departments in the yard. It is done on his demand, disobedience of his orders being the charge.

The effect of this derangement of our naval system is a double mischief. The yards are filled with a sort of electioneering lazaroni, who, being appointed and retained on wages there, to operate in the canvass for their political patrons, are unsuited to the employment to which they are nominally assigned; are placed beyond the reach of discipline of the commander within the yard, their responsibility attaching solely to their patron who appoints them to perform political service; and so the navy yard becomes mainly a sort of depot of

election managers, who set the civil police at defiance on election day, and open the way to ballot stuffing, and who, through the authority of their patrons with the Secretary, derange the police of the naval establishment, while billeted upon it in the interval of elections. Proof is adduced, in the report of the Committee on Expenditures, pointing to the mischief of thus subjecting the navy, gathered at the city stations, to abuses to subserve party interests; but the most striking proof is to be found in the report of a commission of distinguished officers, who have passed from one navy yard to another, to look into the causes of the decay of energy, discipline, and economy, which once characterized our establishments. At New York, Boston, Norfolk, and Philadelphia, they find their original vigor sapped by one of prevailing disorder, and the cause of it the malaria of politics.

The Board, after going through, item by item, all the abuses which have deranged the whole system, thus say:

"In conclusion, the board would beg leave to recommend that the efforts now being made by the officers in the New York navy yard to maintain discipline, introduce economy and efficiency, and break up the system of political patronage, be sustained by the head of the Department. They are convinced that no navy yard can be made efficient, or to serve the purposes for which it was intended, unless the commandant of the yard is supported in the exercise of his legitimate authority, and the minor departments are held strictly responsible, and the heads of them liable to dismissal for any act subversive of the discipline by which our naval establishments should be governed.

"We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants.

F. H. GREGORY, *Senior Officer.*
G. J. VAN BRUNT, *Captain U. S. Navy.*
C. H. POOR, *Com'r U. S. Navy.*
JOHN R. TUCKER, *Com'r U. S. Navy.*
DAVID D. PORTER, *Lieutenant.*

"Hon. ISAAC TOUCEY, *Secretary of the Navy.*"

This is the appeal they urge in respect to the other navy yards. These honest officers are sensible that an unscrupulous Secretary can harass them in their profession, and thwart them in their interests and comforts and honorable ambition for admonishing him of the fatal influence he has infused into the naval service of his country, but in the pride they feel in the glory of the flag and its constellation of stars which they look up to as the emblem of their country, they do not hesitate to point again and again to the vile mire into which he has dragged it.

They go to Norfolk, and find things there equally bad. They sum up the abuses there in this way:

"The master workmen, considering themselves necessary to their political friends, and being assured of protection, have assumed a bearing independent of proper authority, out of keeping with their position, and not to be found in any other navy yard. It is very apparent to the board, although they have not taken much evidence on this point, that the leaders of a majority of the shops are politicians, and have around them a set of men who are selected as much for their political as mechanical character."

They come to Philadelphia, and find the navy yard in a commotion. They point to the cause:

"According to an estimate made by persons, in evidence, the extra number of men unnecessarily employed in the

Philadelphia yard would, if cut down, be a saving of over \$100,000 a year, which would add one fine ship to the navy early; and as an increase of the navy is the great desideratum, it is desirable that the reduction be made as soon as possible.

"*Politicians have too much way.*
The present state of things existing in this yard is, no doubt, owing to officers yielding from time to time to political influences, which the Government alone had the power to regulate."

This may be called Mr. Florence's navy yard. Say the officers:

"The master blacksmith is a politician, and admits it, and there is evidence on record to show that he does not always employ the most efficient kind of men; moreover, his shop is crowded with a larger number of persons than is justified by the quantity of work going on here. He has on occasions been known to defeat the efforts of officers of the yard to keep men off, and admits that he used his influence with a member of Congress, in Washington, to have thirty men put on, when it was denied him by the proper authority of the yard. There are now in his department 104 men, with foreman, quartermaster and a larger gang of men than is employed in New York."

This introduction of men into the yards to bear down on elections is developed in the official lists of the hands employed. In Jan., 1857, the number in the Philadelphia navy yard was 574; to meet the necessities of Mr. Florence's election in October following, the number was 1,722.

All here is of a piece. It is all election machinery. The President himself did not hesitate to come to the rescue, when Mr. Florence's district was about to drive him out of this stronghold which belongs to him in virtue of his seat in Congress. It was on this occasion that the President interposed, and set aside the rights of the lowest bidder, (the Novelty Works, New York,) to give the contract for the machinery of a sloop to Merrick & Sons, Philadelphia, for the reasons shown in this correspondence, which fell into the hand of the Committee:

"PHILADELPHIA, September 13, 1858.

"DEAR SIR: I venture to suggest to you the importance of awarding the contracts for the machinery of the sloop now building at the navy yard at this time and if it can be done without prejudice to the public service, to Merrick & Sons. Theirs is the only establishment in the first district which employs a large number of mechanics; at this time, 390; when in full work, 450.

"The managing partners (Mr. M., sen., being absent, in bad health) are full of energy, straining every nerve to keep their force during this depression, and, in so far as I know, the only of Whigs of any influence in that district who are in favor of the re-election of Col. Florence.

"I know, from former experience, the value of that influence, and feel persuaded that it is the interest of the Democratic party to increase it.

"The first district will, I hope, be carried in any event, but with that shop at work, full handed, two weeks prior to the election, the result would, I think, be placed beyond all doubt. With much respect,

"The PRESIDENT. W. C. PATTERSON."

This letter was sent to the Secretary of the Navy, by the President, with this endorsement:

"September 15, 1858.

"The enclosed letter from Colonel Patterson, of Philadelphia, is submitted to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy.

J. B.

"The undersigned regard this as a serious offense. It is the duty of the Secretary to determine which of the bidders was 'the lowest responsible bidder,' and to award, to him the contract. It is a judicial act. The rights of parties under the law, and the rights of the Government, were involved in the award.

"If the President had suggested to a judge of the United States courts that he render a judgment in favor of one of

the parties litigant in a cause pending before him, because that judgment would aid in the election of a party favorite, or would contribute to the success of the Democratic party, the general voice of the people would demand his impeachment. Is it a less serious offence when this suggestion is made by the President to the Secretary of the Navy? The judge is beyond the power of the President; the Secretary is within his power. Each is required to perform judicial functions. The suggestion by the President of corrupt motives to either, is equally dangerous, and is more likely to succeed with an officer whose tenure of office is the will of the President."

The scraps here inserted from official reports show that the House Committee, the House of Representatives itself, and the board of officers, all condemn the combination of political intrigue and corruption with the naval service of the country, making the latter subservient to the selfish schemes of the civil office-holders, at the expense of its usefulness, and the high character it had earned under other Administrations.

The proneness of the present Administration to turn the naval as well as the military service to account in creating jobs and patronage to gain another term in the Presidency is seen in its Paraguay as well as its Utah war. A brief sketch of the Paraguay war is worth considering, in this view, as particularly characteristic of the Buchanan policy.

Hopkins, who got up this war, was a partner in a Rhode Island trading company, which sent him to Paraguay, to establish a cigar business there, obtaining the place of Consul from our Government to dignify his business. He was always, it seems, from his personal history, as a school-boy, a midshipman, and trader, a most obnoxious person, pregnant with quarrels everywhere, and in the semi-barbarous Republic of Paraguay he managed to put the whole community, President and all, into distress about a trifle. This is a brief of what transpired, taken from the account of Captain Page, of the Water Witch, who interposed in the affair on the side of the Consul, who had, from his official character, involved the interests of the country in his private quarrel.

"Of the difficulty, I have no idea of entering into detail, further than to state that the immediate cause of its outbursting at that particular time was an assault made by a soldier on the person of the brother of Mr. Hopkins, while riding with a lady, also a foreigner. The man was driving cattle to the city, and, on being met or overtaken by the riding party, the herd was dispersed into the wood. There was no personal injury to the lady or the gentleman, but the insult was to be considered and justly made a subject of complaint. President Lopez took exception to the language in which the complaint was made; a paper war ensued; crimination followed recrimination. The consular exequatur was revoked, and the wrath of the Chief Magistrate extended to the members of the American Company, of which Mr. Hopkins was agent. Decrees, (or *Bandos*), intended to embarrass their operations, were

issued, and at last the cigar factory was closed."

The decree which produced this happy result for Mr. Hopkins, (who now claims nearly a million of dollars for indemnity,) as given by Captain Page, is:

"All foreigners must take out a license to engage in any commercial or industrial pursuit."

The Captain adds: "This last article was reasonable, but the Company, though going on for a year, had not before been required to take out a license; and when Mr. Hopkins made an application for it, in the character of 'general agent,' having paid sixteen dollars for the stamped paper, it was refused, on the ground of his being *general agent*. This title was objectionable, and would not be recognised. He must apply as 'agent,' and not as 'general.'" "I am to this day (says the Captain) mystified by this phase of the difficulty. There was but one General in Paraguay, the son-in-law of the President; but by what process of reasoning the title of the 'general agent' reflected upon the head of the military arm of the Government, I am unable to say; neither do I see why it should not be relinquished."

It seems that Hopkins, who was simply an "agent," took the title, and with it the assumption, of General, which the President, only understanding in the military sense, considered as arrogating equality with his heir, whose dignity it was meant only to deride—an offensive interpretation, which the quarrel of the Consul with the President suggested. At this stage of the controversy, Captain Page arrived, and "found Mr. Hopkins determined, by reason of the course of the Government, to leave the country, with the members of the Company, and such of their effects as could be conveniently removed."

The Captain interposed to restore amity. He says: "I called on President Lopez; was courteously received, and discussed the difficulty between the Government and Mr. Hopkins at some length. The President said the soldier [who had insulted the brother of Hopkins] had been severely punished by the infliction of three hundred stripes in 'running the gauntlet' through the regiment to which he was attached. He complained of the intemperate language of Mr. Hopkins. It was, he said, insulting to him, and he had, in consequence, withdrawn his exequatur. That the agent, Mr. Hopkins, was personally obnoxious to him, and he would not consent to his engaging in any business in the country." But the President assured him "that the American Company would be allowed to carry on its operations under a guaranty of protection, and shielded from the possible recurrence of insult or indig-nity." The Captain continues: "I wrote Mr. Hopkins by appointment, and informed him of the result of my interview with the President. He then informed me that the business of the

Company had been broken up by the action of the Government, regardless of all pre-existing contracts; and that he would hold it responsible for the damages, looking to the United States Government for the enforcement of the reclamation; that under the circumstances he wished to withdraw from Paraguay, but that no trading vessel would take them, the masters fearing that the odium in which he was held by the Government would be visited on him."

It is the game of some of our ill-doing traders among the petty neighboring Republics, and especially among our Indian tribes, to get up difficulties, provoke injuries, and then get the strong hand of our Government to extort indemnities. All the fraudulent claims set up against Mexico, in which our people speculate, are for the most part of this sort, the claimants calculating on the avidity of our contiguous States for acquisition of Mexican territory, and relying, in the event of quarrel between the Governments, that they may get their asserted demands paid out of the United States Treasury, as so much in liquidation of the amount to be paid for ceded territory. It is so with Indian annuities, which are often swallowed up in indemnities. Hopkins is not too scrupulous to be an expert in this mode of speculation, and he was dexterous enough to get out of the country at the expense of our Government, which he also involved in an expense of many millions, to get at his reclamation. Captain Page removed his difficulty about removal. He told him, "I will see the President; and if no arrangement can be made for your leaving the country by a trading vessel, I will receive the members of the Company and their effects on board the Water Witch, and convey them to Corrientes—this being the point at which we wished to establish them."

The Captain called on the President, and he said he should have the "permit" asked by Page. But alas! another difficulty arose. The Captain explains it: "A vessel was engaged, passports obtained, and I concluded that all was satisfactorily arranged for the departure of the Company, when one of the Company came on board the Water Witch, and complained of fresh insults by the chief of police. The Captain went to the President. The policeman was sent for, charged by the President, and denied every word, rising to his feet as he spoke."

Then came another difficulty: "On applying for the 'permit' to ship the goods, it had been refused until Hopkins should surrender the papers, deeds, &c., which secured to the Company certain property purchased and paid for by the Company."

Hereupon, Capt. Page took pen in hand, "telling the President what would be my course for the relief of the Company, if they were not allowed to depart by the usual mode of conveyance." The Secretary of Foreign

Relations desired, by verbal message to the Captain's clerk, "to take my notes, (the Captain's,) and requested me to have them translated. I replied, verbally, that I must correspond with the Government in my own language, and would not allow my letters to be translated by any one associated with me." This bit of etiquette brought about the war. The notes were returned to the Captain. He (Capt. Page) sent them back, and informed the Captain of the Port that he "should receive them (the Company) and their effects on board, and leave Asuncion at a certain hour. Scarcely had the announcement been made, when President Lopez issued the permit, showing conclusively that his Excellency was fully informed of the contents of my notes, if he did not understand English. It was late. The Americans were in the act of coming on board before its issue was made known. It expedited matters, however, for it was accompanied by an order to the Port Captain to afford them every facility in shipping their goods."

Capt. Page's last note had produced great alarm. The Captain says: "Not a soul was abroad; not a man, cart, or horse, was to be seen, except a few conveying the effects of the American Company to the beach. What was feared?" The following explanation was made: "Last night, the President called a consultation of his advisers, at which your letter was considered. The wise heads thought they saw in it another Greytown affair. His Excellency thought that, as heavy bodies move slowly, it would be prudent to be prepared; so he sent for a machinist to examine his carriage, and see that all was in good running condition. Orders were issued that none should appear in the plaza or streets after eleven o'clock this morning, and not a horse or cart, except those engaged in transporting the goods of the American Company, was to be seen." "The Brazilian Consul, an amiable, gentlemanly man, came on board the Water Witch, and expressed, with much anxiety, the hope that I was not really about to fire into the town. I assured him I had no such intention," &c. "The preparations of the steamer, with her three howitzers planted on board, as a protection against savages, was simply a duty to meet any exigency that might occur."

Thus the effect of Capt. Page's diplomacy and preparations for action on board his ship had inspired terror enough to make him vain. "I had, it is true, resolved, that if the property of the Americans was retained by the President, or placed beyond the reach of our guns, to return the compliment by capturing his navy at Tres Bocas," &c. "On reaching Tres Bocas, we observed an unusual array of soldiers and the little navy of five vessels, with their armament, ranging from two to six guns, all doubly manned, and ready, as the President had said, 'to salute or fight.' The vessels were

moored so close to the bank, that a plank from each would have enabled the personnel of the marine to make an excursion into the interior of the country at the shortest possible notice. On the deck of the flag ship, a prominent figure in the picture, stood my old friend, the Admiral. Salutes would have been dangerous; for, from the evident state of hostile preparation, the first flash of one of their guns might have been returned by a fire from our howitzer, without delay for explanation. We passed slowly on, and in silence, many a soul on the Water Witch devoutly hoping, perhaps, that some brave son of Paraguay would provoke a fight."

Now it is very evident, from the panic in the town, that the President and his people had discovered in the Captain's note, (which is not given in his volume here quoted,) and from the bearing of the Water Witch, that there was a spirit somewhere "to provoke a fight." Capt. Page ingenuously admits that, up to this time, he had no pretext for it; "as it had yielded every point, as the Americans were personally safe and on board the Water Witch, and the 'permit' had been issued to facilitate the shipment of the goods, there was no possible excuse for so extreme a measure. I was not at all ambitious of the achievement of firing into a town, destroying the property of inoffending citizens, perhaps the lives of women and children, and disturbing the course of a Government with which I had been directed to treat for commercial intercourse."

Nevertheless, the threatening note which Captain Page had addressed to the President, his refusal to translate it, and sending back those addressed to him, together with the alarming preparations on board the Water Witch, where Hopkins, the vindictive enemy of the President, had taken his place, filled the town with apprehensions of this formidable stranger, which could easily have taken his flotilla and burned his town. He therefore, on the 3d of October, issued this decree:

"ART. 1. In the navigation of the rivers of the Republic, foreign vessels of war are excluded.

"2. The expatriations of the rivers of Upper Paraguay, which are embraced within the territories of the Republic or of other neighboring States, cannot be made through the Lower Paraguay pending the settlement of limits with the neighboring Powers, Brazil and Bolivia."

These decrees would undoubtedly be within competency of England, France, or the United States, in regard to waters within their boundaries. Notwithstanding this interdict, Capt. Page sent the Water Witch into the Parana. Here is his account of the result:

"Lieutenant Jeffers had advanced but a short distance above the junction of the Parana and Paraguay, plating the work as he progressed, when, from very deep water, the vessel was run upon a sand-bank, the lead at the gangway indicating no material change in the depth. While in the act of getting the steamer afloat, a boat came alongside from a fort on the Paraguay shore, where was a flag-staff, but no flag flying, and presented a paper to Lieutenant Jeffers, who returned it to the messenger, informing him that he did not read Spanish. This, with

the substitution of the word 'Spanish' for 'English,' was President Lopez's reply to my communication in behalf of Americans in Asuncion. He observed some bustle and activity at the fort; and, to be prepared for any emergency, put the vessel in the best state of defence he could, but scarcely admitting to himself the possibility of attack.

"She was got afloat; and on asking the pilot where lay the channel, he unhesitatingly said that it was near the Paraguay shore, but he had supposed the river was high enough to enable the Water Witch to pass over the shoals near the left bank, and made the attempt without informing the commanding officer. The pilot, like many other Argentines of the same class, looked upon Paraguay as a semi-civilized country, and was anxious to put a great distance between the Water Witch and Fort Itapira. He was ordered to change the course of the vessel, and the nature of the work was again intelligently explained to him, that he might understand the importance of keeping in mid-channel, regardless of its vicinity to the Paraguay shore, or whether there was water enough outside of it. When the Water Witch was within close shot, two or three blank cartridges were fired from the fort, in quick succession, followed by a shot. At what part of the vessel it was aimed, I can only judge by President Lopez's dispatch to our State Department, where he magnanimously says it was directed so as to 'pass ahead.' If so, it struck wide of the mark, and was unfortunately effective, for it passed through the after port, cut away the wheel, and killed the helmsman. Lieutenant Jeffers had disregarded the blank cartridges, and up to that time had withheld his fire. Indeed, his means of defence, with three howitzers, one twenty-four pounder, and two twelve pounders, were small against a brick or stone fort. But, when this shell came, he returned it as rapidly as the reduced number of his officers and crew and the disabled condition of the helm would admit. The accuracy of the fire was seen in cutting away the flag-staff, and in the shrapnel grazing the low wall; for the guns were mounted on barbettes. We learned afterwards that several Paraguayans were killed; some reports said eleven, others fifteen."

So ended the affair, which is here presented in the light in which Hopkins and Page gave it. What President Lopez had to say for himself was not material to President Buchanan. The sequel shows that the latter engrafted on the facts thus reported a message to Congress, denying the validity of the decree of Lopez against navigating the river, because only one side of it belonged to him, and because the Water Witch "was not a vessel of war," and did not come within the decree, and because citizens of the United States "had their property seized and taken away from them." The two last facts stated by Mr. Buchanan are not supported by Captain Page's statement; and the first point, as matter of law, will hardly be admitted, if a nation, holding one side of a river with a fortress, sees it approached by an armed vessel, which vessel refuses to receive a message by a flag, and refuses to pause on the firing of blank cartridges. Lopez ordered "a shot ahead," as is common to bring a vessel to. Fearing, from observation of what was passing on the Water Witch, that the shot might bring on a battle, he sent a countermand of his order. It did not arrive in time. From this it would seem that what occurred was the effect of a double accident. In proof of the sincerity of Lopez, the fact that he sent to the widow of the man killed \$10,000 gratuity may be urged. These circumstances are spoken of by Com. Shubrick, whose good sense and humanity closed the war so honorably; and as our Government sought no indemnities for its vast ex-

penditures, it would seem to have been satisfied with the explanation.

It is very clear, from Mr. Page's statement, that means were at hand to compel Lopez to make prompt atonement for whatever wrong he had committed, or to punish it to the utmost, without resorting to this expensive expedition. Captain Page descended the river, met Com. Salter at Montevideo, with the Savannah flag-ship and the Germantown, and in his note, 18th April, says:

"Have had a conversation with the Commodore since my visit of 31st, and urged the propriety of sending the Germantown up, towed by the Water Witch, to knock down Itapira. Captain Lynch, in a nob'e, generous spirit, which I fully appreciate, had proposed to the Commodore to take the Germantown up, or relinquish the command of the ship to me for that purpose."

The Commodore said :

"I cannot move in this matter. The affair is referred to the Government, and I shall await instructions."

Captain Page's comment is :

"The Fort Itapira ought to have been knocked down, and we should now be even with the Paraguayan Government. I begged but for two guns, and I would have pledged my life in the effort."

This is the whole case. Three vessels lay at the mouth of the river, awaiting the President's instructions, the least of which, furnished with two additional shell guns, might have produced submission, or the destruction of the town, the fort, and Lopez's whole flotilla. Neither alternative suited Mr. Buchanan. It presented a fine opportunity to carry out his policy at home. It develops itself. After presenting the case to Congress as recounted, he adds, very modestly :

"I am constrained to consider the attack upon her (the Water Witch) as unjustifiable, and as calling for satisfaction from the Paraguayan Government. A demand for these purposes will be made in a firm but conciliatory spirit. This will the more probably be granted. If the Executive shall have authority to use other means in the event of a refusal."

Well, he had "other means" enough to back a conciliatory message to Lopez at the mouth of the river, and to blow up his little Republic in case of contumacy. But that would have been a short job, and far away. President Buchanan's policy required jobs at home; and his skill in creating them out of this affair, and using them in aid of his political management, will add another trophy to his reputation. The President and his Secretary Toucey thought it indispensable to accompany a demand "for satisfaction," in a firm, conciliatory spirit, with a fleet of fifteen vessels of war!!! Seven of these were steam ships, chartered from the merchant service, on terms which made it necessary to buy them, having cost more than they were worth in refitting and alterations to bear cannon—the refitting amounting to \$141,026.86 at first, and accumulating ever since. There were twenty-six small vessels employed in transporting coal. Cost of the coal, \$201,094.02.

The flag-ship (the Sabine) which conveyed the Commissioner, Hon. Mr. Bowliu, cost in provisions alone \$45,454.50. The purchase

of the chartered vessels cost \$289,000; but the Secretary of the Navy furnishes only some of the extra charges incurred by the expedition, in reply to the resolution requesting the Committee on Expenditures to inquire into and report on the expenditures of the Paraguay expedition. The Secretary answers, laconically: "It is impossible to give an exact statement of the total expense of the expedition;" and there he drops it. It must be guessed from aggregates. The present term of four years more than doubles Mr. Van Buren's term. The expense of the naval service of Mr. Buchanan's past two years is almost twenty-seven millions, doubling that of Mr. Madison's naval expenses during the war with Great Britain, when the glory of our flag of stars illuminated the ocean.

But there are circumstances which prove that Mr. Buchanan's war upon Paraguay was not for glory, but to furnish means of corruption. It has appeared already how it has poured its current into and through our naval departments. The charter and repairs of the seven steamboats afterwards purchased, added to the tide which preparation of the national vessels for war began to raise. But, outside of the political laboratories, this war gave motion to considerable political influence along the seaboard. Mr. Hopkins and his Rhode Island incorporated trading company were called into action for the Administration. Then Cromwell & Co., who sold out their line of merchant steamers for war ships, have an establishment in New York, and one in Baltimore, and traded all along South. This company, in selling out their old ships, were set to build more, and were thus put in control of a multitude of voters. Then two hundred thousand dollars spent in the coal mines gave a money impulse there for the Administration. Then the twenty-six vessels employed in the transportation of the coal would call out an expenditure among the masters which might be made to tell all along shore. In addition, Mr. Toucey found a job account in the purchase of the steamers, after they were all reported by their officers, after trial, as wholly unfit for war vessels. "Their slightness of construction;" "helpless condition at sea;" "imperfect machinery;" "patched boilers, (one with one hundred patches,) much burned;" "unmanageable under canvas;" "many weaknesses;" "ordinary pumps would not keep afloat;" "engines broken down;" "vessels unable to carry a battery, from want of speed, and exposure of machinery, not at all adapted to purposes of war;" "unsafe to make a voyage of any great distance on the ocean"—all this, and much more represented by the officers in their correspondence with the Secretary, while on their voyage, creeping from island to island, and the ports along the continent, to river La Plata, could not deter him from purchasing these ships of war. Com. Shubrick says, if they had been with him on the ocean

when the storm struck his flag-ship, the Sabine, that all would have gone down. To persons unacquainted with the recent management of the navy in polities, such a purchase would seem inexplicable. Those acquainted with the abuses in the navy yards know that the worthlessness of these vessels were their recommendation. They are rebuilt at the navy yard, under appropriations for repairs, when they can be no longer patched up. Congress feels bound to allow estimates for repairs, when they would not vote for new ships; but ships are sometimes thus made new without a stick of the old, and bearing nothing but the name, and even this is occasionally changed.

And this increase of the navy, in leaky, rotten, worm-eaten, worn-out merchant steamers, is all that results from the many millions sunk in the Paraguay war, if the commission given to the President's friend, the Hon. Cave Johnson, does not produce something more. He is to hunt up prettexts for an indemnity to Hopkins & Company for insulting and alienating a young and rising Republic. The nation must lose its trade by extorting near a million from Paraguay to satisfy the *General* agent for being refused permission to sell his cigars, probably only "a beggarly account of empty boxes."

The Utah war has ended quite as ignominiously. Kansas, the President confesses to Mr. Walker in his private letter, on opening the campaign, was its primary object. Until "you are out of the woods," he tells the Governor, you shall keep Harney and his army. "*Kansas is vastly more important to us at this moment than Utah.*" All the war could accomplish here, was to exclude the State from the Union; he could not enslave it.

What has he done for Utah? The Secretary of War, in his report to Congress at the session before the last, alludes to the demands which had been made on "*that body for appropriating the large sums of money necessary for crushing the treason at a single blow.*" Now that the ten millions have been spent, and the blow struck, what is the result? The Secretary tells us in his last report:

"Affairs in the Territory of ~~Utah~~ ^{Utah} remain very much as at the date of my last annual report. The army is inactive, and stands in the attitude of a menacing force towards a conquered and sullen people. I am satisfied that the preservation of right and justice through the means of any jurisprudence known or recognised by the people of the United States, is impossible in that Territory. It is governed practically by a system which is in total disregard of the laws or Constitutions of the land. The laws of the Mormon church and the will of the hierarchy are alone potent there. Beyond a mere outward show of acquiescence in Federal authority, they are as irresponsible to it as any foreign nation.

There is in the present attitude of affairs scarcely any necessity for the presence of troops in Utah, and they will be otherwise disposed of in the coming season. There are no complaints of Indian hostilities towards the Mormon people. All other Territories and people upon our vast frontiers suffer from Indian depredations, but the Mormon people enjoy an immunity from all these outrages. For the protection of these people against Indians, there is no necessity for the presence of a single soldier. Murders and robberies of the most atrocious

character have been perpetrated in the Territory ~~upon~~ ^{by} emigrants from the States, journeying towards the Pacific, and in some of the most shocking instances by white men disguised as Indians. The general impression, so far as I have been able to ascertain it among those having opportunity to know, is, that these murders are the work of the Mormon people themselves, sanctioned it not directed by the authority of the Mormon church."

The Mountain Meadow massacre, in which one hundred and twenty peaceful, respectable emigrants fell—a butchery extending through five days, within a few miles of the Mormon settlements, leading Mormons looking on, and after receiving the spoil from the Indians, all detailed in Mr. Forney's (Indian superintendent) report—makes it certain that the Secretary is well founded in the statement that Mormons are the instigators in this war against emigration across the central part of the continent. The butchery of Captain Gunnison and his party of explorers to open this way, it is almost certain was their work. But besides this participation in Indian atrocities, which may be only the crime of a few confederate Mormons, the Secretary thus charges the whole community:

"After the open acts of war by the Mormon people against the United States, in seizing the provision trains of our army and destroying them by fire, & stealing and driving off the herds of cattle and horses belonging to the command, although these were essential, as everybody supposed, to the maintenance of our troops, and their protection against starvation, these people continued to manifest every proof of a fixed determination to push their treason to the extremity of bloodshed and war."

Then a long list of Mormon violations of the Constitution and laws is given, to justify the Administration in the signal vengeance it had taken, of which the Secretary seems proud:

"This movement upon this Territory was demanded by the moral sentiment of the country—was due to a vindication of the laws and Constitution—and was essential to demonstrate the power of the Federal Government to chastise insubordination and quell rebellion," &c.

The report does not tell how this insubordination was chastised and rebellion quelled, but goes on to say:

"These people, however, still evince a spirit of insubordination and moody discontent. The necessity which called for the presence of the troops in Utah will require a strong force still to be kept there."

Now, what was the chastisement of the treason, the bloodshed, the robberies, the conflagrations, the attempt to starve a whole army? What was the spirit in which our Executive, with a powerful army at his bidding, rebuked all this? Defied by Brigham Young at every step in their progress, our poor-spirited President submits at last to beg the way for his army to Salt Lake City, without encounter, through the intervention of a private citizen, Thomas L. Kane, the brother of the Arctic explorer. The President writes a letter of credence to this envoy, but, with his usual duplicity, disavowing that he did "send any agent to visit them in behalf of the Government." This letter is a master piece of Buchanan diplomacy. Mr. Kane goes to the Mormons, and lets them know what vengeance awaited all their crimes. They were to have, in the first place, a general amnesty for all their crimes—cover-

ing up the blood of the innocents shed on the Mountain Meadow, that of Captain Gunnison's exploring party, the robbery and fire of the army trains, and, in a word, all the treason, from first to last—Young on his part promising nothing, but allowing Governor Powell and Ben McCullough (the commissioners sent to him after Kane had obtained leave) to say "that it was agreed that the officers civil and military of the United States should peaceably and without resistance enter the Territory of Utah, and discharge, unmolested, *all their official duties.*" Brigham did not even sign this agreement, but merely adds a note, admitting that it was "*said in said conference.*"

Now, the Secretary of War admits in both of his reports, since the agreed case, that Brigham Young has acted on his mental reservation, and so acted that neither the laws nor Constitution have been permitted to have any force in the Territory. That the Mormons "keep up strictly their organization, which has for its object and end the complete exclusion of Federal authority from all participation in the Governmental affairs in the Territory beyond a mere hollow show." This he tells Congress at its session before the last, to show that it must appropriate money to keep the army there, and keep up "the mere hollow show." In the report to the last session he even gives this up, and proposes to take the army away, and surrender the Territory to the Mormons. Meantime the Mormons are grown rich on the market the army has afforded them, and are speculating on all the spoils obtained in exchanges. For instance, they bought hundreds of wagons used as transports for the army and its provisions, for \$20 each; they now sell the same wagons, to transport the army away, at \$150 each.

Now, the question is, why does our Government submit to Young's Government, instead of bringing his to submission? The answer is, his is a slave State. The army was raised not to subdue a slave State, but to make Kansas a slave State. Young has not only established negro slavery, but has established a system that must end in enslaving the feeble and dependent of the white race. He can have but one wife at a time of the sixty he holds as such. The rest are slaves. This plurality means nothing but concubinage, and is in fact a denial of the rights of wedlock to those who are enslaved. In other sections, the rights of marriage in slaves are denied or broken at pleasure. In Mormondom, a man may have as many wives as he can buy; and as this makes it literally a matter of money, he may dispose of them, without regard to what mankind generally consider sacred ties. This allies both white and black slavery in Utah in some sort with negro slavery in the South; and from this sympathy of institutions, the Senate, at the last session, put down the bill of the House of Representatives, declaring polygamy a crime, and punishing it as a violation of the morals and laws of the country. The executive power at Washington, which indeed in all its branches

is in subserviency to the South, understands their sympathy; and hence its leaning to the crimes of Brigham Young's Government. Hence, while the Secretary declares that this Government is the accomplice of the Indian murderers who beset the path of the emigrant on every central route to the Pacific, the troops are removed because the Mormons do not need defence against the Indians, and thus, in blocking the middle way to California, are serving the interests of the slave States, which desire to drive the emigration into the ox-how route down the Mississippi, across through desert Arizona, and up again north along the Pacific to San Francisco. The Postmaster General violated the law, and pays \$600,000 a year to change to this out-of-the-way course the post route contemplated by the law. This was done to give its direction to the railroad across the Continent. The Executive persists in this design, and hence the middle of the Continent is surrendered to the Mormons and their savage allies.

Aud this is all our gain from the Mormon war, which made the annual military expenses of the Government equal to those of the war with Great Britain, and would have raised them four millions higher, if the Republican party had not voted down the demand of the President for an increase of the standing army by the addition of four more regiments of regulars. A regiment costs a million each year. This would have raised Mr. Buchanan's army outlay above twenty-three millions, very nearly the total expense of the entire Government under Mr. Van Buren. The four regiments were voted down, and Mr. Buchanan doubtless would give this as a reason for leaving Utah in the hands of Brigham Young, as Secretary Floyd admits it is, if Congress had not offered the President a force of volunteers to bring him to obedience or drive him from the country. The Executive refused the volunteers. They had driven these Ishmaelites out of Missouri and Illinois, and if permitted to drive them out of Utah we should have one slave State less.

In the passages commented on in this paper, the Administration has written its own history. The evidence cited against it is drawn from reluctant witnesses of its own party. They show it to be the creature of the slave power, which every age exhibits, prone to despotic government and corruption. Its strength is in the combination and organization of all who profit by its oppressions. Being at war with the ennobling principles of humanity, it necessarily appeals to the worst instincts and passions for support. Where freedom prevails, it can have no party on honest principles. *There it must buy a party.* Hence their appeals to the sordid leaders of the once patriotic Democracy of the free States, successfully holding out to their avarice and ambition, advancement to the high places and patronage of the Government. The result of their prostitution has been the ruin of the party whose name and organization they abused.



